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Ernest E. Figari, Jr.,*
Thomas A. Graves,** and A. Erin Dwyer***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions, a statutory enact-
ment, ' and amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.2 This
Article examines these developments and considers their impact on existing
Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
A recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court, Seay v. Hall,3 addressed
the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court to adjudicate the claims of a
wife-administratrix for wrongful death and for personal injury arising from
her husband's death. Section 5(d) of the Texas Probate Code4 authorizes a
statutory probate court to hear all matters incident to estates. According to
section 5A(b) all claims by estates fall within this grant. 5 Relying on the
legislative history of these enactments, however, the court concluded that
they limited probate court jurisdiction to matters in which settlement, parti-
tion, or distribution of an estate was the controlling issue.6 The court con-
cluded that the state district court was the proper forum for survival and
wrongful death actions, 7 noting that neither settlement, partition, nor distri-
* B.S., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist
University. Attorney at Law: Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. The enactment of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code has several procedural impli-
cations. Act of May 15, 1985, ch. 959, 1985 Tex. Gen, Laws 7043 (codified as TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. (Vernon Pam. 1986)). As noted in the introductory section to the
codification, the Code represents a "revision of the state's general and permanent statute law
without substantive change." Id. § 1.001(a) (emphasis added).
2. As a result of these amendments, eight rules were modified. These changes became
effective Apr. 1, 1985. See Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 TEX. B.J. 182 (Feb. 1985).
3. 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984), rev'g 663 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984). See
generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw.
L.J. 421, 422 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Annual Survey] (discussing court of appeals
opinion).
4. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN, § 5(d) (Vernon 1980).
5. Id. § 5A(b).
6. 677 S.W.2d at 23.
7. Id. at 25.
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bution of an estate was the controlling issue in those actions.8
The Texas Declaratory Judgment Act,9 which provides that "[c]ourts of
record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed,"' 1 was the subject of recent jurisdictional scrutiny. Given
the broad language of the Act, uncertainty had existed as to whether it em-
powered a trial court to entertain a potential defendant's action in a tort case
seeking a declaration of nonliability. Answering in the affirmative, the
supreme court in Abor v. BlackII found the necessary jurisdictional grant in
the Act. The court emphasized, however, that the trial court should have
declined to exercise such jurisdiction, as it deprived the real plaintiff of the
traditional right to choose the time and place of suit. 12
The court in Gannon v. Payne' 3 addressed an international tug-of-war in
which the plaintiff, a Texas resident, had filed suit against a Canadian resi-
dent, seeking damages for alleged fraud. After entering a general appear-
ance, the defendant initiated a competing action in Canada against the
plaintiff. The plaintiff countered with a request in the Texas court to tempo-
rarily enjoin the defendant from prosecution of the Canadian action. After a
hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the request. Appealing from
this injunction, the defendant challenged the power of the trial court to halt
the Canadian action. The court of appeals affirmed, reiterating that when a
plaintiff files suit in a court that has jurisdiction of the parties and subject
matter, "that court may proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdic-
tion by enjoining the parties from prosecution of another suit subsequently
filed in another court, involving the same subject matter."' 14
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The most significant development in the area of jurisdiction over the per-
son was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 15 The plaintiff, a Florida corporation and franchisor of
Burger King restaurants, granted a twenty-year franchise to the defendant, a
Michigan resident, for the operation of one of its restaurants in the Detroit
area. The negotiations leading up to the grant occurred in both Michigan
and Florida. The resulting agreements provided, however, that the franchise
relationship was established in Miami where the plaintiff was headquartered
and stipulated that payment of all required fees should be sent to that loca-
tion. The parties further agreed that Florida law would govern their rela-
8. Id. at 24.
9. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965), repealed and recodified as
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
10. Id. § 1, repealed and recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.003
(Vernon Pam. 1986).
11. 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985).
12. Id. at 566.
13. 695 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
14. Id. at 744; accord V.D. Anderson Co. v. Young, 128 Tex. 631, 636, 101 S.W.2d 798,
800 (1937); Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 16-17, 285 S.W. 1063, 1072-73 (1926).
15. 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
[Vol. 40
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
tionship. When the business of the Michigan restaurant later declined, the
defendant fell behind in the monthly payments. The plaintiff eventually ter-
minated the franchise. After the defendant refused to cease operations at the
restaurant, the plaintiff commenced suit in Florida seeking damages and in-
junctive relief. The defendant, whose physical ties to Florida were virtually
nonexistent, contested the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The trial court
overruled the objection, but the court of appeals disagreed, concluding that
the defendant was without reasonable notice and financially unprepared to
litigate the franchise matter in Florida due to the circumstances surrounding
the franchise negotiations. ' 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the defendant had
"established a substantial and continuing relationship with Burger King's
Miami headquarters, [had] received fair notice from the contract documents
and the course of dealing that he might be subject to suit in Florida, and
[had] failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum would otherwise
be fundamentally unfair .... ,,17 While conceding the absence of physical
presence on the part of the defendant in the forum, the Court reiterated that
"[j]urisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the
defendant did not physically enter the forum State."' 8 In this regard, the
Court observed that an absence of physical contacts will not defeat personal
jurisdiction in a state when a commercial actor purposefully directs its ef-
forts toward residents of that state.' 9
The Court noted a division among lower courts as to whether and to what
extent a contract constitutes a contact for due process analysis. 20 The Court
emphasized that a contract is merely an intermediate step tying up business
negotiations, whereas the consequences of these negotiations are the main
purpose of the business transaction.2 ' These consequences and negotiations,
along with the terms of the contract and actual dealings, are all important
factors in determining whether the defendant purposefully established mini-
mum contacts with the forum.22 Finally, the court pointed to the defend-
ant's envisioned twenty-year relationship with Burger King in Florida, to his
refusal to make the contractual payments in Miami, and to the foreseeability
of injuries caused by his use of Burger King's trademark and confidential
business information even after his termination, in holding that the defend-
ant could reasonably be hailed to Florida to account for the injuries. 23
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the
choice-of-law provision was irrelevant to the question of personal jurisdic-
tion.24 The Court observed that although the provision alone was insuffi-
16. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (2-1 decision),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
17. 105 S. Ct. at 2190, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 550.
18. Id. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543 (emphasis in original).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2185, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 544.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2186, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 545.
23. Id., 85 L. Ed. 2d at 545-46.
24. Id. at 2187, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 547.
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cient to confer jurisdiction, the choice-of-law provision, combined with the
twenty-year interdependent relationship between the defendant and Burger
King's Miami headquarters, made it reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
that litigation was possible there. 25
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, article 203 lb,26 is continually the
subject of judicial measurement. Section 3 of article 2031b authorizes the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident when he is doing business in
Texas. 27 Doing bisiness, as defined by section 4, includes "entering into
contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in
whole or in part by either party in this State."'28 A recent Fifth Circuit
decision, Stuart v. Spademan,29 reiterated a two-pronged test for meeting the
requirements of due process when effecting service under article 2031b.
First, "the nonresident must have some minimum contact with the forum
which results from an affirmative act on his part" and, second, "it must be
fair and reasonable to require the nonresident to defend the suit in the forum
state."30
The plaintiffs, two residents of Texas, sued the defendant, formerly a resi-
dent of California, to recover damages for breach of contract. At the outset
of their relationship the plaintiffs had contacted the defendant in California
regarding an improved ski binding they had invented and attempted to inter-
est him in marketing it for sale. Following several exchanges by mail, a
meeting in Colorado, and the defendant's transmission of prototype bindings
to the plaintiffs in Texas, a written agreement was signed by the plaintiffs in
Texas and by the defendant in California. The agreement provided for an
assignment of the plaintiffs' invention and payments totaling $85,000 to be
made to the plaintiffs in Texas. A subsequent problem with the payments
precipitated the execution of an amendment to the original agreement. The
amendment, which the plaintiffs signed in Texas and the defendant signed in
Nevada where he had recently moved, required the defendant to make pay-
ment directly to the plaintiffs' bank in Texas. It also substituted a neutral
25. Id. The Court's ruling reinforces the importance of a choice of law provision in a
jurisdictional context. See D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754
F.2d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 1985) (lack of choice of law provision emphasized); Hydrokinetics, Inc.
v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1027-31 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (choice of law provi-
sion emphasized in deciding jurisdiction), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180, 80 L. Ed. 2d 561
(1984). See generally 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 423 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Hydrokinetics).
26. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964), amended by Act of May 17,
1979, ch. 245, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 522, 522-23, repealed and recodified as TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.043-.045 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
27. Id. § 3, repealed and recodified as TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044
(Vernon Pam. 1986).
28. Id. § 4, repealed and recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042
(Vernon Pam. 1986).
29. 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 1189; accord D. J. Inv., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754
F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1985); C&H Transp. Co. v. Jensen & Reynolds Constr. Co., 719 F.2d
1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983); Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026,
1028 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180, 80 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1984); Southwest Offset,
Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1980).
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choice-of-law provision" t for the one in the original agreement that specified
that California law was to govern. 32 When the defendant was later unable to
obtain patent coverage on the assigned invention, he advised the plaintiffs he
was discontinuing payments under the agreement. The plaintiffs countered
with a suit against him in Texas, and service was effected on the defendant
under article 203 lb. The defendant responded with a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the suit and an ap-
peal from that ruling ensued. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that mini-
mum contacts consisting of the negotiation and closing of a contract using
interstate commerce, a few shipments of goods to the forum at the instiga-
tion of the plaintiff, and the mailing of payments to the forum, are not suffi-
cient constitutionally to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. 33
In addition to acting in an individual capacity in his interstate dealings
with the plaintiffs, the defendant was also the president of a corporation that
licensed and proposed to market the improved bindings in Texas. Appar-
ently realizing the weakness of their primary position, the plaintiffs argued
that the corporation's Texas activities should be attributed to the defendant
so as to sustain jurisdiction over his person. In this connection Stuart is
instructive for its obverse consideration of the fiduciary shield principle. 34
Under that principle the acts performed by an officer of a corporation in the
forum state on behalf of a corporation generally cannot be attributed to him
individually so as to sustain nonresident service over his person. Acknowl-
edging that an individual's contacts as a corporate representative may be
attributed to him individually when the individual has completely domi-
nated the corporation, 35 the Fifth Circuit nevertheless concluded that an in-
sufficient showing had been made to justify in this instance disregarding the
corporate entity for jurisdictional purposes. 36
The Supreme Court of Texas concluded during a previous survey period
that service under article 2031b is not complete until the secretary of state
31. The choice-of-law provision in the amendment stated: "All of the terms of this agree-
ment as amended shall be subject to and shall be construed and enforced according to the laws
of the state in which the aggrieved party under the terms of the contract is residing at the time
such breach of contract or grievance occurs." 772 F.2d at 1188.
32. Id. As the court noted, "this particular choice-of-law provision adds little to the mix
of contacts previously considered since the provision is tied to the residence of the parties-a
factor already taken into account as a part of the minimum-contacts analysis." Id. at 1196 n.9.
33. Id. at 1194.
34. The fiduciary shield principle provides: "[I]f an individual has contact with a particu-
lar state only by virtue of his acts as a fiduciary of the corporation, he may be shielded from the
exercise, by that state, of jurisdiction over him personally on the basis of that conduct."
Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); accord Weller v. Cromwell
Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 929 (5th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction over corporation's individual officers
cannot be based solely upon jurisdiction over corporation); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d
1277, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 1969) (even if foreign corporation is subject to service because it
transacts business through agents operating in forum state, such agents are not engaged in
business so as to allow application of long-arm statute to them as individuals unless agents
transact business on their own behalf apart from corporation).




forwards process to the nonresident defendant. 37 In order to establish the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant's person the record must
therefore affirmatively show that the process was forwarded. 38 This showing
may be made by filing a certificate of mailing issued by the secretary of
state.39 In the case of an unreceptive defendant, the trial practitioner has
been concerned with the question of whether a certificate indicating that pro-
cess was forwarded but returned unclaimed by the defendant satisfied this
service requirement. Answering in the affirmative, the court of appeals held
in BLS Limousine Service, Inc. v. Buslease, Inc. 40 that service to the appel-
lants was in accordance with article 203 lb despite the return of the citations
to the secretary with a notation "refused" upon them.41
In Southern Distributing Co. v. Technical Support Associates, Inc.42 the
court addressed a relatively obscure provision of article 203 lb. Section 5 of
that article stipulates that when process is delivered to the secretary of state
for forwarding to a nonresident defendant, the secretary of state "shall re-
quire a statement of the name and address of the home or home office of the
nonresident" to facilitate such forwarding. 43 The record before the court
revealed that the secretary of state received only the address of the corporate
defendant's service agent under California law and that he forwarded the
process to that location. The plaintiff thereafter obtained a default judgment
based on that service. The corporate defendant sought to have the default
judgment set aside, arguing noncompliance with section 5. Finding that the
address of the California service agent was not the equivalent of the home or
home office address required by the statute, the court ruled the plaintiff had
not fulfilled the requirements of section 5 and set aside the judgment.44
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Two cases during the survey period, Liberty Enterprises, Inc. v. Moore
Transportation Co. 45 and Portland Savings & Loan Association v. Bernstein,46
illustrate the risks of taking action in the trial court inconsistent with the
prosecution of a special appearance. After nonresident service was effected
on the defendant in Liberty Enterprises, the time within which the defendant
had to file an answer expired, and the trial court entered a default judgment.
Three weeks later the defendant filed a special appearance and a motion for
37. Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973); see Figari, Texas Civil
Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 248 (1974).
38. 500 S.W.2d at 96.
39. Vanguard Inv. v. Fireplaceman, Inc., 641 S.W.2d 655, 656, (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
40. 680 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (en banc).
41. Id. at 546.
42. 105 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
43. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 5 (Vernon 1964), repealed and recodified as
TEX. CIV. PROC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
44. 105 F.R.D. at 2; accord Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 823
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
45. 690 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985).
46. 693 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
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new trial. The trial court entered an agreed order granting a new trial. The
trial court denied the defendant a heating on its special appearance, how-
ever, concluding that its actions in the case amounted to a general appear-
ance. The defendant perfected an appeal on this point and the supreme
court reviewed the ruling. Pointing to the defendant's statement in its mo-
tion for new trial that it was ready to try the case when properly set for trial
and noting that the defendant had agreed to the order allowing the new trial,
the supreme court found that the defendant had made a general
appearance.47
The conduct of the defendant in Portland Savings & Loan Association was
more precarious. After asserting a special appearance, the defendants filed a
motion for sanctions arising from a discovery dispute and a motion to dis-
qualify the plaintiff's counsel, neither of which was conditioned on the ear-
lier jurisdictional challenge. More importantly, the motion for sanctions was
principally directed to discovery on the merits and concluded with a request
that it be decided "before any other matter is heard.'' 48 The court relied on
rule 120a49 in finding that the defendants had entered a general appear-
ance.50 The court found that the defendant failed to comply with the re-
quirement in rule 120a that jurisdictional challenges must be heard before
any other matter, since the defendant's motion for sanctions are directed on
the merits rather than the jurisdictional hearing.5 1
The Texas supreme court's decision in Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middle-
ton 52 is instructive as to the permissible scope of a challenge by special ap-
pearance. Resolving a conflict among decisions of the courts of appeals,5 3
the court emphasized that "defective jurisdictional allegations in the peti-
tion, defective service of process, and defects in the citation must be chal-
lenged by a motion to quash, not a special appearance. '5 4 Thus, under rule
120a a nonresident defendant may not contest curable defects in service of
47. 690 S.W.2d at 571.
48. 693 S.W.2d at 480 (emphasis in original).
49. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a (a motion challenging jurisdiction must be heard before any
other plea).
50. 693 S.W.2d at 480.
51. Id.
52. 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985).
53. Compare Steve Tyrell Prod., Inc. v. Ray, 674 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex. App.-Austin
1984, no writ); with TM Prod., Inc. v. Blue Mountain Broadcasting Co., 623 S.W.2d 427, 431-
33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 639 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1982);
Menchaca v. Chrysler Life Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980,
no writ); In re D.N.S., 592 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Mills v.
Stinger Boats, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 106, 107-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Burgess v. Ancillary Acceptance Corp., 543 S.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); and Curry v. Dell Publishing Co., 438 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1969, writ refd n.r.e.). See generally Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article
2031b, the Texas "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdic-
tion in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. L. REV. 279, 312-13 (1964) (rule 120a only allows a
special appearance to challenge jurisdiction).
54. 699 S.W.2d at 203.
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process by a special appearance. 55
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Several decisions during the survey period invalidated service of process
on the basis of inadvertent errors occurring in the course of service. In
Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. 56 the petition stated that
service could be effected by serving "Henry Bunting, Jr.," the registered
agent of the corporate defendant. The citation and officer's return, however,
reflected that service was effected on "Henry Bunting." Finding that the
omission of "Jr." from the name on the citation and return represented a
material deviation from service requirements, the supreme court invalidated
the service and set aside the default judgment founded on such service.5 7
The use of an outdated form by the clerk was the apparent source of error
in Smith v. Commercial Equipment Leasing Co. 58 The clerk of the court in
which a case is pending is authorized under rule 10359 to effectuate service
on a defendant by registered or certified mail. The citation used for this
purpose in Smith, however, advised that "[t]his citation may be served by
the sheriff or constable ... and he shall deliver to the above named party, in
person, a true copy of citation with the date of delivery endorsed thereon."60
Although it was undisputed that the defendant received the process, the
supreme court pointed out that the citation's language might mislead a de-
fendant to believe that personal delivery of the citation was required and
would subsequently occur.61 For this reason, the court concluded that the
manner of service conflicted with the terms of the citation and it invalidated
the default judgment founded on such service.62
Finally, in Cox Marketing, Inc. v. Adams 63 the court was concerned with a
default judgment based on a return that recited merely that the executing
officer had served the defendant's agent on a specified date. Relying on rule
107, which stipulates that the return of the executing officer shall specify the
manner of service, 64 the court admonished that "[a] recitation that the agent
'was served' states only a conclusion as to service being perfected and does
not show the manner of service." '65 Finding noncompliance with rule 107,
55. Id.; accord Steve Tyrell Prod., Inc. v. Ray, 674 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex. App.-Austin
1984, no writ).
56. 690 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. 1985).
57. Id. at 885. Contra Salazar v. Tower, 683 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ) (omission of suffix "Jr." did not render service of process fatally
defective).
58. 678 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1984).
59. TEx. R. Civ. P. 103. See generally Pope & McConnico, Practicing Law with the 1981
Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 485-86 (1980) (discussing the duties of sheriffs and
constables under rule 103).
60. 678 S.W.2d at 917.
61. Id. at 918.
62. Id.
63. 688 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
64. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
65. 688 S.W.2d at 218.
[Vol. 40
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
the court set aside the default judgment. 66
Article 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act 67 sets forth the proce-
dure for effecting service on a corporation. The statute allows for service of
process on the secretary of state if a corporation's registered agent cannot be
located.68 The secretary of state must then send a copy of the process by
registered mail to the corporation's registered office. 6 9 In Houston's Wild
West, Inc. v. Salnas70 service of process on the defendant corporation was
made in this fashion at a private post office box, but the postal service re-
turned the copy of process with the notation "Returned to Sender."' 7' Since
the plaintiff had fulfilled the requirements of article 2.11, the trial court en-
tered a default judgment against the corporation on the basis of this service.
The defendant corporation subsequently attacked the default judgment, con-
tending that service was improper because it had not received actual notice
of the suit. The court of appeals found the service to be in compliance with
article 2.11 since the corporation had a duty to maintain a registered office in
this state, and "[i]f a corporation elects to maintain a private postal box as its
registered address in lieu of an actual location where the registered agent
himself may be found, the corporation then assumes the risk of not receiving
notices delivered." '72
The decision in Global Truck & Equipment, Inc. v. Plaschinski,73 which
also arose under article 2.11, stands as a warning to plaintiffs' attorneys that
in order to support a default judgment under article 2.11 the pleadings must
adequately allege the registered office. In Plaschinski the petition merely
alleged that service could be effected at a particular address. Pursuant to
article 2.11, the secretary of state made the required forwarding of process to
that location. The trial court entered a default judgment, and the defendant
subsequently attacked it by writ of error. The court of appeals found the
record devoid of any allegation that the location to which process was for-
warded was the registered office of the defendant. 74 The court of appeals
thus concluded that strict compliance with article 2.11 was lacking and set
aside the default judgment.75
66. Id.
67. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1980).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 690 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. Id. at 31.
72. Id. at 32; see TXXN, INC. v. D/FW STEEL Co., 632 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1982, no writ) (corporation cannot assert as ground of error failure to receive
service of process when failure was caused by corporation).
73. 683 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
74. Id. at 769.
75. Id.; accord Travis Builders, Inc. v. Graves, 583 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1979, no writ); see Encore Builders v. Wells, 636 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ) (company failed to designate properly agent for service of process);
Charles Cohen, Inc. v. Adams, 516 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ)
(strict compliance with art. 2.11 is necessary to uphold a default judgment against attack based
on invalid service of process); White Motor Co. v. Loden, 373 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. Civ.




Lawyers Civil Process, Inc. v. State ex rel. Vines76 grew out of an uprising
of service officers. The sheriff and constables of Dallas County commenced
the suit seeking a permanent injunction against the process serving activities
of two private firms. The State of Texas intervened with a claim in quo
warranto. The trial court found that the private firms were executing civil
processes without an order authorizing such action. The trial court enjoined
the conduct, and the defendants appealed. Rule 106(a) of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that "[u]nless the citation or an order of the court
otherwise directs, the citation shall be served by any officer authorized by
Rule 103 .. . ,,77 Rule 103, in turn, authorizes a sheriff, constable, or clerk
to effect service.7 8 Discerning no general authorization in the rules for the
use of a private process server, the court of appeals held that one of the
named officers must first attempt service under rule 106(a). 79 The court con-
cluded that if this requirement is met, a motion for substituted service may
be filed. 8 0 Upon the proper showing, the trial court may order service by a
private process server in accordance with rule 106(b). 8 1
x V. VENUE
Cases interpreting the Tex venue scheme as it existed before the 1983
amendments continue to linger in the courts. In Bohnert v. Barbour82 a
third-party defendant who was impleaded in a negligence action filed a third-
party action seeking indemnity from an architect. After the trial court sus-
tained the architect's plea of privilege to be sued in the county of his domi-
cile, the original third-party defendant appealed, claiming that article
2212a 83 controlled the venue determination. The court of appeals agreed,
holding that the architect became a named defendant in the primary suit for
purposes of article 2212a when the contribution claim was filed against
him.84 Following the rule announced in Arthur Brothers, Inc. v. U.MC.,
Inc. ,85 the court ruled that the special venue provision included in the com-
parative negligence statute extended to third-party defendants whom the
76. 690 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
77. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(a) (emphasis added).
78. Id. 103.
79. 690 S.W.2d at 942-43; accord Garcia v. Gutierrez, 697 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
80. 690 S.W.2d at 942-43.
81. Id.; accord Garcia v. Gutierrez, 697 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, no writ).
82. 679 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
83. Act of Apr. 9, 1973, ch. 28, § 1, 2, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41, 41-42 provided that all
claims for contribution between named defendants in the primary suit were to be determined
in the primary suit. Article 2212a was repealed effective Sept. 1, 1985, by Act of May 15,
1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 7043, 7218, which enacted the CPRC. Section 2(g)
of the prior statute has been substantially recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.017 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
84. 679 S.W.2d at 703.
85. 647 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1982) (purpose of art. 2212a, § 2(g) is to maintain all contribu-
tion claims in the original suit). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 289, 296-97 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Annual
Survey] (discussing the supreme court decision in Arthur Bros.).
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plaintiff had not originally named as defendants.8 6
Before its amendment in 1983, the Texas venue statute provided generally
that "[n]o person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the
county in which he has his domicile .... ,"87 Following earlier authorities,88
the court in Canales v. Estate of Canales8 9 held that an out-of-state resident
had no right under the general venue provision to be sued in any particular
county unless venue was controlled by some mandatory provision of the stat-
ute.90 The defendant in Canales, who had relocated to Dallas before the
venue hearing, asserted in an amended plea that venue against her was
proper only in Dallas County. The court ruled, however, that she had
waived her venue rights by filing an answer subject to the original plea of
privilege. 9' According to the court, the original defective plea was a nullity
and the subsequent amended plea thus failed to conform with the require-
ments of pleading in due order, since it came after the defendant had already
filed an answer on the merits.92
The court in Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell93 appears to have an-
swered a question that was settled under the old venue statute94 but was
raised anew by the successor statute.95 In Hendrick the plaintiffs filed suit
against several defendants in Jefferson County, who responded by filing mo-
tions to transfer venue to Jones County. After the trial court sustained the
defendants' motions and transferred the cause to Jones County, the plaintiffs
took a nonsuit. The plaintiffs then refiled the same action in Dallas County,
naming a different group of defendants. After the Dallas court overruled the
second group of defendants' motions to transfer venue, the plaintiffs
amended their original petition and named the original Jefferson County de-
fendants as additional defendants in the second suit. These defendants also
filed motions to transfer venue, which the trial court overruled on the
ground that similar motions by the co-defendants had already been deter-
mined and rule 87(5) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure proscribes a
86. 679 S.W.2d at 703. The court found that the clear intent of the statute was to consoli-
date in one primary suit all issues of contribution and indemnity that were otherwise un-
resolved through settlement. Id. The court therefore rejected the architect's attempt to
distinguish his suit from Arthur Bros. on the basis that the party claiming against him was a
third party defendant himself rather than an original named defendant. Id.
87. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964), amended by Act of June 17,
1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119-24, repealed and recodified as TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
88. See Pegram v. Owens, 64 Tex. 475, 477 (1885); Nolte v. Saenz, 153 S.W.2d 281, 282-
83 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, no writ).
89. 683 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
90. Id. at 79.
91. Id. at 79.
92. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
93. 690 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
95. The so-called "new" Texas venue statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995
(Vernon 1964), amended by Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119-24,
effective Sept. 1, 1983, has itself been repealed and recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 15.011-.064 (Vernon Pam. 1986). Apart from a recodification and renumber-
ing of sections, the statute remains unchanged.
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second hearing.96 The defendants then petitioned the Dallas court of ap-
peals for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to transfer the cause to
Jones County.
The court of appeals agreed with the defendants that venue was conclu-
sively established in Jones County as a result of the Jefferson County judge's
prior order of transfer and the subsequent nonsuit by the plaintiffs. 97 In
reaching that conclusion, the court specifically noted that amended rule 87
contemplates only one venue determination in a cause of action. 98 A plain-
tiff could easily circumvent the intent of rule 87, according to the court, if
the plaintiff could avoid a binding venue determination simply by nonsuiting
and subsequently refiling the same suit in a county other than that in which
venue was determined to be proper. 99 Although the court acknowledged
that the correct venue result was obtained under the old statute by judicial
imposition of a res judicata rule, °° the court based its holding upon the
pertinent provisions of the new venue statute itself rather than resorting to
notions of res judicata 0 1
In spite of its agreement with the defendants' position regarding venue,
the court in Hendrick denied the requested mandamus.10 2 Section 4(d)(1) of
article 1995 as amended in 1983 expressly provided that no interlocutory
appeal should lie from the venue determination. 1 03 According to the court,
acceding to the defendants' request for issuance of a writ of mandamus
would allow what amounted to an impermissible interlocutory appeal. 104
Moreover, since section 4(d)(2) 10 5 of amended article 1995 preserves a de-
fendant's right to appeal the trial court's improper venue ruling, and reversal
in this situation is automatic, the court concluded that an adequate remedy
other than mandamus was available to the defendants. ° 6
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(5) provides that once a venue determination has been made by the
trial court "no further motions to transfer shall be considered regardless of whether the mo-
vant was a party to the prior proceedings or was added as a party subsequent to the venue
proceedings ...." Id.
97. 690 S.W.2d at 44.
98. 690 S.W.2d at 44; see supra note 96.
99. Id. Of course, a plaintiff who believes that a venue determination has been incorrectly
made may still challenge that determination on appeal from the trial on the merits. Id. at 45.
100. Id. at 44 (citing Wichita Falls & S.R. Co. v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 555, 558, 174
S.W.2d 951, 952 (1943); Poynor v. Bowie Indep. School Dist., 627 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ dism'd)).
101. 690 S.W.2d at 45 n.2.
102. Id. at 45.
103. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(d)(1) (Vernon 1964), amended by Act of
June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2124, repealed and recodified as TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon Pam. 1986).
104. 690 S.W.2d at 45-46. The court specifically noted that this latter holding conflicts
with dictum in a sister court's opinion that suggested mandamus would lie in such a situation.
Id. at 45 n.3; see Ramcon Corp. v. American Steel Bldg. Co., 668 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
105. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(d)(2) (Vernon 1964), amended by Act of
June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2124, repealed and recodified as TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon Pam. 1986) provides that an improper
venue determination constitutes reversible error on appeal from the trial on the merits.
106. 690 S.W.2d at 45; see State v. Archer, 163 Tex. 234, 353 S.W.2d 841, 841 (1962)
(mandamus ordinarily does not lie if another remedy is adequate and available).
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Although only one venue determination is permitted under the amended
statute and rules, US. Resources, Inc. v. Placke10 7 held that a trial court that
orders the transfer of a cause of action may reconsider and rescind its order
before the case has been transferred. '0 8 Under the appellate court's interpre-
tation of rule 87(5), subsequent motions to transfer are not permitted once
the action has actually been transferred. ' 0 9 Finding no authorities holding
that an order to transfer immediately effects a transfer of the case, the court
of appeals concluded that a trial court may reconsider its original order if
the case has not yet been transferred and the decision of the trial court is
timely made. 10
VI. LIMITATIONS
The limitations provision contained in the Texas health care statute'
again generated a flurry of cases during the survey period. During the last
survey period the supreme court held in Nelson v. Krusen112 that article 5.82
of the Texas Insurance Code' 13 was unconstitutional insofar as it cut off a
cause of action belonging to the parents of a diseased minor before the plain-
tiffs could have known about their son's affliction. 114 This term, as pre-
dicted, '15 the supreme court extended that holding to article 4590i, section
10.01,116 the successor to article 5.82. In Neagle v. Nelson 117 the court con-
firmed the view it expressed in Krusen that the open courts provision of the
Texas Constitution' 1 8 protected a citizen from legislative acts that abridged
his right to sue before he had a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong
and bring suit." t9 Accordingly, the court held that section 10.01 of article
4590i unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiff of his right to sue the defend-
ant for medical malpractice since the plaintiff was unable to discover that his
107. 682 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
108. Id. at 405.
109. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(5).
110. 682 S.W.2d at 405. Unfortunately, the court's opinion fails to set forth clearly what is
considered a timely reconsideration. Although the opinion contains a lengthy discussion
aimed at answering this question, the analysis pertains only to Act of May 17, 1971, ch. 236,
§ 5, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 1086, 1087, a special statute governing post-judgment filing periods
in Lee County that was subsequently repealed by Act of June 7, 1985, ch. 297, § 1, 1985 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2444, 2444.
111. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (two-year stat-
ute of limitations on health care claims).
112. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Pro-
cedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 421, 427-29 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985
Annual Survey] (discussing the supreme court's opinion).
113. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865, repealed by Act of
June 16, 1977, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064, purported to establish an
absolute two-year statute of limitations for filing malpractice suits against physicians or hospi-
tals carrying liability insurance.
114. 678 S.W.2d at 923.
115. See 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 112, at 429.
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (essentially
recodifing former art. 5.82, § 4 of the Texas Insurance Code).
117. 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
118. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (all courts are open to every person).
119. 685 S.W.2d at 12.
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surgeon had left a surgical sponge in his abdomen following an appendec-
tomy until more than two years after the operation.'
20
Implicit in the court's reasoning was a reaffirmation of its earlier holding
in Krusent 2 1 that the discovery rule 122 is inapplicable when the health care
limitations statute governs the case. 123 In light of the concurring opinions
filed in Neagle, however, that assumption is no longer free from doubt.124
Moreover, as Justice Kilgarlin correctly pointed out in his concurrence, the
majority opinions in both Krusen and Neagle failed to discuss how much
time a plaintiff has in which to file suit after discovering his injury, assuming
that the discovery rule is inapplicable.125
At least two other courts during the survey period wrestled with the issues
the supreme court left unanswered. The court in Reed v. Wershba' 26 inter-
preted Neagle as holding only that a plaintiff who could not have discovered
his injury until after the two-year limitations period had already expired
could file his suit within a reasonable time after discovering the injury. 127
After expressly noting that Neagle did not decide what period of time would
be considered reasonable, 2 8 the court concluded that section 10.01 was not
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff since she discovered her injury a
full thirteen months before the two-year limitations period had expired. 129
In Melendez v. Bea'130 the court avoided the question entirely by holding
that section 10.01 did not abrogate the discovery rule.1 3 ' According to the
Melendez court, whose opinion preceded the decision in Neagle, a suit filed
within two years of the injury is timely if there is no showing that the patient
knew or could have known of the injury earlier. 132 Although this view of
the law finds support in Justice Robertson's concurrence in Neagle, the hold-
ing in Melendez is of doubtful validity in light of the subsequent majority
opinion issued in Neagle. 33
120. Id.
121. 678 S.W.2d at 920.
122. The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations will not start running until
the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to his claimed damage or until the date of
discovery should reasonably have been made. See Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.
1972); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1967). See generally 1983 Annual Sur-
vey, supra note 85, at 300-01 (discussing the discovery rule and its effect on the statute of
limitations).
123. If the discovery rule were applicable, the limitations statute could not abridge an indi-
vidual's rights under the open courts provision because the limitations period would not com-
mence until the plaintiff discovered or could have discovered the injury.
124. Compare 685 S.W.2d at 13 (Robertson, J., concurring) (discovery rule issue remains
an open question) with 685 S.W.2d at 14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring) (article 4590i, § 10.01
abolished discovery rule).
125. 685 S.W.2d at 14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
126. 698 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
127. Id. at 371.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 683 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
131. Id. at 873.
132. Id.
133. The court in Melendez also reversed the defendant's summary judgment on the basis
that the health care provider adduced no summary judgment evidence that it carried liability
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The effect of article 5537134 on the limitations period prescribed in article
4590i was considered in Hill v. Milani. 35 The court held that the tolling
provision of article 5537 does not affect the two-year limitations period es-
tablished by the health care statute. 136 Stating that article 5537 was not part
of the "statutory scheme for medical malpractice claims envisioned by the
legislature," the supreme court ruled that the tolling provision was part of
the "other law" expressly made inapplicable by the language of article
4590i. 137 In reaching the same result earlier, 138 the court of appeals at-
tempted to distinguish the decision in Valdez v. Texas Children's Hospital. 139
The Valdez court held that article 5538 suspends the commencement of the
article 4590i limitations period in the case of a party's death. 140 Although
the supreme court's opinion in Hill did not specifically address this apparent
conflict, the court's analysis casts serious doubt on the Valdez holding.' 4I
Finally, in Vanklaret v. Cane142 the Austin court of appeals held that
under article 4590i the statute of limitations begins to run at the end of the
last treatment for the condition that gave rise to the suit. 143 A year earlier
the same court had ruled that the statute was not tolled for the entire dura-
tion of the physician-patient relationship if the relationship continued only
with respect to medical matters unassociated with the claim.' 44
As noted in last year's survey, 145 the Fifth Circuit held in Mann v. A.H.
Robins Co. 146 that the Texas discovery rule applied in a Dalkon Shield case
and tolled the applicable statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovered
the cause of her injury.147 The court repeated its conclusion in Woodruff v.
A.H. Robins Co.,1 48 again predicting that Texas courts would apply the dis-
covery rule in Dalkon Shield litigation if called upon to decide the issue.149
The hapless defendant finally made its way into Texas state court during the
current survey period, and the Fifth Circuit's prediction about Texas law
insurance. Id. According to the court, even if the limitations statute abolished the discovery
rule, it did so only as to insured health care providers. Id.
134. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5537 (Vernon 1958), repealed and recodified as TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.063 (Vernon Pam. 1986), suspends the running of cer-
tain limitations periods during a defendant's temporary absence from the state.
135. 686 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1985).
136. Id. at 613.
137. Id.
138. Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), afld, 686 S.W.2d 610
(Tex. 1985).
139. 673 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ), discussed in 1985
Annual Survey, supra note 112, at 429-30.
140. 673 S.W.2d at 344; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5538 (Vernon 1958), repealed
and recodified as TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.062 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
141. See 686 S.W.2d at 611-13.
142. 691 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
143. Id. at 110.
144. See Atha v. Polsky, 667 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ rerd n.r.e.).
145. See 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 112, at 427 n.89.
146. 741 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984).
147. Id. at 81-82.
148. 742 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1984).
149. Id. at 230.
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proved correct. 1 50
In addition to medical malpractice cases the courts handed down several
decisions concerning limitations in other areas of professional malpractice.
In Nelson v. Metallic-Braden Building Co. 151 the court considered the consti-
tutionality of article 5536a, the statute of limitations governing malpractice
claims against engineers and architects for defective design and construction
of improvements. 152 Although the same court had previously upheld the
constitutionality of article 5536a on two occasions,1 53 the plaintiff, en-
couraged by the recent decision in Krusen, argued that the limitations stat-
ute violated the open courts provision by effectively abrogating his
established common law cause of action against the designers of an allegedly
defective building. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention, however,
because his claim for damages against other defendants, including the owner
and operator of the building in question, survived the application of article
5536a.' 54 The court held that unlike the litigants in Krusen, the plaintiff was
not effectively denied a cause of action for his injuries. 155
The holding in McCulloch v. Fox & Jacobs, Inc. 156 appears more expan-
sive. The McCulloch court applied article 5536a to a defendant homebuilder
that did not actually design or construct the community swimming pool in
question. After examining the facts, the court concluded that the defendant
functioned as a builder or supervisor, rather than as an owner, of the im-
provements since the defendant furnished money, planners, engineers, and
subcontractors for the swimming pool and periodically performed supervi-
sory and inspection duties. 1
57
In Allright, Inc. v. Guy 158 the court held that the Texas saving statute 159
operates from the date an order of dismissal becomes final.160 Article 5539a
permits a plaintiff who files an action within the applicable limitations period
that is later dismissed for want of jurisdiction to refile the action in a court of
proper jurisdiction within sixty days of dismissal even if the statute of limita-
150. See Corder v. A.H. Robins Co., 692 S.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985,
no writ).
151. 695 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. Act of June 2, 1969, ch. 418, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 1379, 1379, repealed and
recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.008-.009 (Vernon Pam. 1986). The statute
provides a ten-year period of limitations for filing suits against architects and engineers alleg-
ing injury arising out of defective improvements. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.008(a) (Vernon Pam. 1986). The period commences to run after the substantial comple-
tion of the improvements. Id.
153. See Sowders v. M.W. Kellog Co., 663 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982).
154. 695 S.W.2d at 215.
155. Id.
156. 696 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. Id. at 922.
158. 696 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
159. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958), repealed and recodified as
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
160. 696 S.W.2d at 605.
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tions has since expired. 161 In Allright the court of appeals dismissed the
original action for want of jurisdiction in the trial court. The plaintiff then
filed a writ of error with the supreme court, which was refused. Since the
plaintiff refiled his lawsuit in the proper court within sixty days of the
supreme court's action on the writ of error, his second suit was timely filed
under article 5539a.162
The court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Martin Surgical Supply Co. 163
held that an amendment asserting claims under the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act (DTPA) 64 relates back to the time the suit was initially filed.' 6 5
The court's decision was in accord with an earlier decision 166 holding that
the "relation back" doctrine applies to DTPA claims. 67
VII. PARTIES
Few decisions during the survey period addressed issues involving parties.
Only two cases of importance were reported, and both of those concerned
mandamus proceedings brought with respect to third-party interventions in
the trial court. In First Alief Bank v. White' 68 a bank sued the defendants to
collect on two promissory notes and to foreclose attachment liens on prop-
erty owned by the defendants. Following commencement of the litigation,
the defendants sold the property to a third party. After the bank obtained a
judgment from the trial court awarding recovery on the notes and ordering a
foreclosure of the attachment liens, the third party intervened in the case in
an effort to block the property sale. The trial court overruled the bank's
motion to dismiss the plea in intervention and set aside its earlier judgment
in favor of the bank. In a subsequent mandamus proceeding the supreme
court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the earlier judg-
ment because more than thirty days had expired since the judgment was
signed.' 69 The court also held that the plea in intervention came too late
since it was filed after judgment. 170 According to the court, a plea in inter-
vention filed after judgment may not be considered unless and until the judg-
ment has been set aside. 17 1 In Brown v. Barlow172 the court ruled that a writ
161. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958), repealed and recodified as
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
162. 696 S.W.2d at 605.
163. 689 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
164. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
165. 689 S.W.2d at 271-72.
166. See Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ
dism'd).
167. Id. at 133-34.
168. 682 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1984).
169. Id. at 252; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d) (court has plenary power to grant new trial or
to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment within 30 says after judgment is signed); id.
329b(f) (after expiration of 30-day period, court cannot set aside judgment except by bill of
review for sufficient cause).
170. 682 S.W.2d at 252.
171. Id. (citing Comal County Rural High School Dist. No. 705 v. Nelson, 158 Tex. 564,
314 S.W.2d 956 (1958)).
172. 685 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
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of mandamus cannot be used to review a trial court's order refusing a party's
request to intervene in an action.173 The court held that an appeal is the
unsuccessful intervenor's remedy when his request is denied. 174
VIII. DISCOVERY
An extraordinary number of decisions during the survey period, including
several supreme court decisions, concerned questions of privilege raised in
the context of discovery. In Giffin v. Smith17 5 an officer of the defendant
corporation refused to answer certain questions on grounds of the investiga-
tive privilege set forth in rule 166b(3)(d) 176 and the attorney-client privilege.
After the trial court refused to order further answers, the plaintiff instituted
a mandamus proceeding in the supreme court. After reviewing the record,
the supreme court concluded that no evidence showed any communications
to the officer to be privileged.177 Significantly, the supreme court held that
the burden was on the party asserting a privilege to produce evidence that
demonstrated its applicability and, unless such evidence was offered, the trial
court should have allowed discovery. 178
A similar holding was handed down in Peeples v. Fourth Supreme Judicial
District.17 9 The defendant in the underlying cause had subpoenaed certain
financial records of the corporation of which the plaintiff was president.
Both the plaintiff and the corporation filed motions claiming that the records
were not material and that disclosure of the records would constitute an
invasion of the corporation's personal, constitutional, and property rights.
The trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff and the corporation then
instituted mandamus proceedings claiming that the trial court should have
conducted an in camera inspection of the records before ruling on the
motion.
The supreme court held that the trial court had not acted erroneously
because no showing had been made to demonstrate the applicability of any
privilege and no specific privilege was claimed. 180 The court outlined the
procedure that must be followed in order to exclude documents from discov-
ery on grounds of privilege or immunity.' 8 l The steps include: (1) the party
seeking to exclude the documents must specifically plead the particular priv-
ilege or immunity and request a hearing on the motion; (2) the trial court
should determine whether an in camera inspection is necessary; and (3) if an
inspection is ordered, the documents must be segregated and produced to
173. Id. at 408.
174. Id. at 408 (citing Matthaei v. Clark, 110 Tex. 114, 126-27, 216 S.W. 856, 861 (1919)).
175. 688 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1985).
176. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d); see infra text accompanying note 185.
177. 688 S.W.2d at 114.
178. Id. The supreme court held that the trial court should have compelled the deponent
to answer questions concerning names and addresses of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts related to the suit, notwithstanding any claim of privilege, and the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing so to do. Id. at 113; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3).
179. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 16, 1985).




the trial court. 182 Failure to follow this procedure results in a waiver of any
complaint about the trial court's action. 83
Several courts of appeals addressed the scope of the investigative privilege
under rule 166b(3)(d).184 The rule renders undiscoverable:
[A]ny communication passing between agents or representatives or the
employees of any party to the action or communication between any
party and his agents, representatives or their employees, [1] where made
subsequent to the occurrence or transaction upon which the suit is
based, and [2] made in connection with the prosecution, investigation or
defense of the claim or the investigation of the occurrence or transac-
tion out of which the claim has arisen .... 185
In Terry v. Lawrence'186 the court concluded that communications as used in
rule 166b(3)(d) does not include photographs taken by an investigator hired
by the defendant. 87 Upholding prior decisions, the supreme court noted
that under the prior version of the discovery rules, 188 the privilege extended
only to written communications. 189 Despite the absence of the term "writ-
ten" in new rule 166b(3)(d), the court concluded that visual communications
such as photographs are excluded from the privilege. 190
The plaintiff in Bearden v. Boone' 91 brought an invasion of privacy suit
against a private investigator. The plaintiff claimed that the investigative
privilege did not apply to communications between the investigator and her
husband or her husband's attorney that occurred in connection with a pend-
ing divorce action. The court of appeals held that the privilege that attached
to the communications could not be abrogated by the filing of a separate
suit. 192
The applicability of the investigative privilege to investigations taking
place before any suit has been filed was considered in three cases decided
during the survey period. In Kupor v. Solito,193 a wrongful death case, the
court refused to apply the investigative privilege to information received by
the defendant doctor the day after the decedent's death. 194  The doctor
claimed that at the time of the communications he was engaging in an inves-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
185. Id.
186. 700 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. 1985).
187. Id. at 193.
188. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167, 186a, 186b (Vernon 1976).
189. See Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. 1977) (photographs not protected
under investigative privilege); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544, 549
(Tex. 1973) (same).
190. 700 S.W.2d at 913.
191. 693 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
192. Id. at 28. The court also held that the investigator's statute was not applicable after
the trial court had ordered discovery. Id. at 27; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4413(29bb), § 28(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (investigator must divulge information when law so
requires). The court did, however, recognize that communications between the husband's at-
torney and the investigator were privileged under the attorney-client privilege. 693 S.W.2d at
28.
193. 687 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
194. Id. at 444.
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tigation of the death out of which the claim arose. The appellate court noted
that the privilege did not apply because no claim was pending at the time of
the communications and the doctor admitted that the communications were
not made in connection with the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit.195
Applying the investigative privilege less strictly, the court in Turbodyne
Corp. v. Heard1 96 did not limit its application to an investigation made in
connection with a pending lawsuit. In the underlying suit, which arose out
of an explosion at a refinery, the plaintiff insurance company began investi-
gating the cause and resulting damage immediately after the explosion. The
insurance company thereafter made payment under its policy and brought
suit to recover from the defendant pursuant to its right of subrogation. The
defendants sought production of documents that had been prepared prior to
payment on the policy, but after the explosion. Based on a literal reading of
rule 166b(3)(d),' 97 which extends the privilege to investigations in connec-
tion with the occurrence or transaction out of which the claim arose, the
court held that the insurance company was not required to produce the re-
quested documents. 98 A similar result was reached in Cupples Products Co.
v. Marshall'9 9 with respect to the scope of the investigative privilege.
Two cases during the survey period concerned the application of the psy-
chiatrist-patient privilege to discovery requests. In Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of
Appeals20° defendants sought to set aside a lower court order prohibiting
discovery of certain psychiatric records. In the underlying action the plain-
tiff claimed that the defendants had tricked her into signing a 1972 deed,
thereby obtaining ownership of a building from her. In response the defend-
ants contended that the plaintiff was aware of the 1972 conveyance and the
statute of limitations thus barred her claims. During the course of discovery
and in response to a court order, medical records were produced, which re-
vealed that the plaintiff had told her psychiatrist in 1972 that the building
had been sold. The defendants then sought to depose the psychiatrist and
his records' custodian, but were prevented from doing so because the plain-
tiff secured a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals prohibiting further
inquiry into the matter on the basis of the psychiatrist-patient privilege.
In its review of the matter, the supreme court disagreed with the court of
appeals and held that the plaintiff could not seek affirmative relief against the
defendants and at the same time make offensive use of the privilege to pre-
vent discovery of information relevant to her claim. 20 ' The court noted that
the medical records contained information materially relevant to the defend-
195. Id. at 443.
196. 698 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
197. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
198. 698 S.W.2d at 706.
199. 690 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
200. 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985).
201. Id. at 107; accord Hensen v. Citizens Bank, 559 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1977, no writ) (offensive use of fifth amendment privilege prohibited); see also Addison,
Mental Health Information: Shrinking Plaintiffs Privilege, 48 TEX. B.J. 1222 (1985) (discuss-
ing the increasingly limited availability of the psychiatrist-patient privilege).
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ants' limitations defense and, accordingly, were discoverable. 20 2
In a similar case the court in Wimberly Resorts Property, Inc. v. Pfeuffer 20 3
ruled that the plaintiff's psychiatric records were discoverable when the
plaintiff was seeking damages for emotional trauma resulting from an acci-
dent. 20 4 As support for its position, the court relied on rule 510(d)(5) of the
Texas Rules of Evidence,20 5 which authorizes disclosure of otherwise privi-
leged matters when the patient relies upon a physical, mental, or emotional
condition as an element of his claim or defense. 20 6 The court of appeals
determined that rule 510(d)(5) was validly enacted pursuant to the supreme
court's procedural rule-making authority,20 7 even if the statute20 that cre-
ated the privilege did not contain the same exception. 209
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller2 10 the court discussed the doctrine of inadver-
tence as applied to the attorney-client privilege. 211 Having produced docu-
ments during discovery that contained attorney-client communications, the
defendant subsequently sought to assert the attorney-client privilege with
respect to certain of the documents, and claimed that their prior production
was inadvertent. Although the court recognized the existence of cases2 12
supporting exemption from discovery when production was inadvertent, the
court held that the exemption did not apply in this case. 21 3 The trial court
was thus justified in finding that no inadvertence had occurred and that the
defendant had merely changed its position about the documents' confidenti-
ality after a new claim had been asserted in the action.21 4
On the basis of the work product privilege, the defendants in Fuller also
objected to the production of certain documents generated by a technical
committee that the defendants had formed to study a problem related to the
case. The court of appeals noted that communications exchanged among
commonly aligned parties may be privileged if they further common de-
fenses.2 15 In the present case, however, the court of appeals held that the
potential liability of the defendants to each other defeated any community of
202. 686 S.W.2d at 108.
203. 691 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
204. Id. at 29.
205. TEX. R. EvID. 510(d)(5).
206. 691 S.W.2d at 29.
207. See Act of May 15, 1939, ch. 25, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201, repealed by Act of June
13, 1985, ch. 480, § 26, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4086 (Vernon) (current version codified at
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon Pam. 1986)).
208. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1986).
209. 691 S.W.2d at 29.
210. 695 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
211. Id. at 772-74.
212. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573
F.2d 646, 651-53 (9th Cir. 1978) (doctrine held applicable when mistake made during very
short discovery period); Fuller v. Preston State Bank, 667 S.W.2d 214, 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (privilege waived when no evidence of mistaken production shown);
Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, no writ) (privilege not
waived when attorney examines opposing counsel's files left on desk).
213. 695 S.W.2d at 773, 775.
214. Id. at 773-74.
215. Id. at 774; accord Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
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interest and the documents were not privileged.21 6
Although decided under a prior version of the discovery rules, Texas Em-
ployers'Insurance Association v. Garza217 is indicative of the supreme court's
insistence on compliance with the requirements regarding disclosure of ex-
perts. Appealing from an adverse judgment, the defendant complained that
the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the testimony of an
expert whose identity had not been disclosed within the appropriate time
limit prior to trial. 2 18 While the supreme court refused the defendant's ap-
plication for writ of error, the court nonetheless disapproved the court of
appeals' ruling that a finding of good cause need not be made in order to
allow the expert's testimony at trial.219 Presumably, the supreme court's
decision will continue to be good law since the current version of the discov-
ery rules also requires a demonstration of good cause before a court can
allow the testimony of undisclosed experts. 220 In Temple v. Zimmer US.A.,
Inc. 221 the identity of the plaintiff's expert was not disclosed prior to trial,
and the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by limiting the expert's testimony to rebuttal matters. 222
GA TX Tank Erection Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp.223 illustrates a com-
mon oversight that is often made regarding disclosure of experts. The plain-
tiff's attorney, although he failed to identify himself as an expert in response
to interrogatories, was allowed to testify, over the defendant's objection, as
an expert on attorneys' fees. Pointing to the lack of evidence demonstrating
good cause for the allowance of such testimony, the court of appeals held
that the attorney's testimony should have been barred. 224 Faced with a simi-
lar situation, the court in Doyle v. Members Mutual Insurance Co. 22 5 con-
eluded that allowing the plaintiff's attorney to testify on attorneys' fees, even
though the attorney was not listed as an expert prior to the trial, was not
error.226 The appellate court found good cause for admission of this expert's
testimony, noting that the attorney had represented the plaintiff at all times
in the action, the petition contained a prayer for recovery of attorneys' fees,
and a considerable portion of the attorney's work on this case was known to
the defendant.227
216. 695 S.W.2d at 774.
217. 687 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1985).
218. Under the 1981 version of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 168 required that,
in response to appropriate interrogatories, the identity of experts and related information had
to be disclosed not less than 14 days prior to trial. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168 (West 1981). See also
New Amendments, 43 Tex. B.J. 767, 774 (1980) (wording of 1981 version of rule 168. Under
new rule 166b(5)(b), such disclosure must be made "as soon as is practical, but in no event less
than thirty days" prior to trial. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(5)(b).
219. 687 S.W.2d at 299.
220. TEX. R. COv. P. 215(5).
221. 678 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
222. Id. at 724.
223. 693 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Id. at 620.
225. 679 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
226. Id. at 778.
227. Id. For a discussion on the subject of undisclosed experts, see Kilgarlin, What to Do
With the Unidentified Expert?, 48 TEX. B.J. 1192 (1985). As noted by Justice Kilgarlin, the
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In analogous situations the courts have also considered cases involving
witnesses and items of evidence not disclosed prior to trial in response to
discovery requests. In Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Center,
Inc. 228 the plaintiff sought affirmation of a trial court judgment in her favor.
The trial court had prohibited a defense witness's testimony, basing its deci-
sion on the fact that the defendant had not amended its answer to a prior
interrogatory requesting the names of all witnesses having knowledge about
the subject at issue. The defendant's appeal succeeded, and the plaintiff filed
an application for writ of error to the supreme court. The court held that
former rule 168(7)229 required defendant to amend his answers when a wit-
ness having knowledge of the case was found after the answers were
made.230 The trial court's refusal to hear the witness's testimony was a
proper exercise of discretion under the circumstances, and the trial court's
judgment was affirmed.23 1
In Evans v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 232 the plaintiffs
were requested and later ordered to produce a taped statement between their
counsel and one of the defendant's employees. When they failed to produce
the tape after two opportunities to do so, the trial court dismissed their ac-
tion. The plaintiff argued that dismissal was too severe a sanction and
should not have been imposed immediately since the tape was subsequently
produced. The court of appeals held, however, that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing the case. 233
In Harris County v. Jenkins234 the trial court allowed the plaintiff's expert
to use a videotape in connection with his testimony at trial, even though the
plaintiff had stated in his answer to interrogatories that he would use no
videotapes and did not inform the defendant of the videotape until seven
days before trial. The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion by the
trial court because it had authority to allow late-filed answers to interrogato-
ries based on a finding of good cause.235
Two other cases addressed issues related to discovery sanctions. After the
defendant served a notice to take the deposition of the plaintiff's two hand-
writing experts, the trial court in Mahan v. Stover236 entered a protective
order requiring the defendant to deposit reasonable fees into the registry of
the court for the experts' deposition time. In this case of first impression, the
appellate court held that the trial court had discretionary authority to issue
supreme court has recently granted a writ in a case involving issues about the guidelines for
allowance of undisclosed expert's testimony. See Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nurs-
ing Center, Inc., 28 Tex. S. Ct. J. 567 (July 17, 1985).
228. 701 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1985).
229. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(7) (West 1984). See also New Amendments, supra note 218, at
774 (wording of rule 168 prior to recent amendment).
230. 701 S.W.2d at 246.
231. Id. at 246-47.
232. 685 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
233. Id. at 768.
234. 678 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
235. Id. at 642.
236, 679 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ dism'd).
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the order in question. 237 In Smith v. White238 the defendants effectively
blocked discovery into certain matters by claiming their privilege under fifth
amendment. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in imposing a cost bond as a sanction for defendant's refusal to allow
discovery. 239
Finally, a number of miscellaneous discovery points were discussed by the
courts. In Lindsey v. O'Neill240 the plaintiff served a deposition notice on
one of the defendant corporations and specified the subject areas in which
testimony was sought. After the trial court ordered that a number of the
subject areas be stricken on the ground that they called for the defendant to
produce testimony from consulting experts, the plaintiff sought a writ of
mandamus. The supreme court granted the writ. In its opinion the court
stated that discovery of mental impressions and opinions of a party's nontes-
tifying experts is not exempt from discovery when those impressions and
opinions were formulated neither "(1) in the course and scope of the 'prose-
cution, investigation or defense' of a claim or a transaction or occurrence
giving rise to a claim [nor] (2) 'in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial.' ",241 The trial court may exempt from discovery an entire category of
expert opinion evidence only if there is proof "that all such evidence was
either acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation. '242
Rule 167243 governs the procedure for requests for production of docu-
ments and provides that the requests shall describe the items sought to be
inspected "with reasonable particularity. ' 244 The request in City of Abilene
v. Davis2 45 sought production of "any and all documents, wherever located
in this state" that "relate to the physical or mental health" of several per-
sons, the documents to include but not be limited to "any statements, affida-
vits, video tapes . . . and any . . . documents . . . which bear upon the
allegations in this litigation or which may be used in this litigation. ' 246 The
court of appeals held that the designation was insufficient, as it failed to
recite precisely what was requested. 247 Accordingly, the court of appeals
held that the trial court's order requiring production of such documents was
an abuse of discretion.248
Finally, for the international lawyer, Goldschmidt v. Smith249 considered
the effect of the Hague Evidence Convention 250 on the efforts of a plaintiff to
237. Id. at 709-10; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4) ("[T]he court may make any order . . .
necessary to protect the movant from . . . unnecessary expense .... ").
238. 695 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ).
239. Id. at 297-98.
240. 689 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1985).
241. Id. at 402.
242. Id.
243. TEX. R. civ. P. 167.
244. Id. 167(l)(c).
245. No. I 1-84-229-CV (Tex. App.-Eastland, Nov. 1, 1984, no writ) (not yet published).
246. Id., slip op. at 2.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
250. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar.
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take a defendant's deposition in West Germany for use in a Texas action.
Although refusing to recognize the Hague Evidence Convention's proce-
dures as mandatory, the court of appeals held that, as a matter of comity, the
plaintiff should resort to those procedures first when seeking discovery in
West Germany rather than the normal Texas rules of procedure. 251 The
court implied that if discovery reaches an impasse under the Convention's
procedures, then the trial court may enter appropriate orders outside the
Convention.252
IX. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Rule 18a, 253 which governs the disqualification of judges, provides that a
motion for disqualification may be filed at least ten days before the date set
for trial. 254 If a judge is assigned to a case within ten days of the date set for
trial, the motion shall be filed at the earliest practicable time prior to com-
mencement of trial. 255 After the motion to disqualify is filed, the judge to
whom the motion is directed is required to recuse himself or, failing to do so,
refer the motion to the presiding judge of the district.25 6 In Gaines v.
Gaines,257 a divorce action, the appellant filed a motion to disqualify five
days after the case had been called for trial. Given the untimeliness of the
motion, the court of appeals concluded that there was no need to consider
the disqualification point of error under rule 18a.258 Apparently unsure
whether rule 18a controlled the application of a related statute governing
disqualification, 259 the court of appeals also concluded that the appellant's
contentions based on the statute were also without merit because the appel-
lant did not establish enough information to warrant referral of the motion
to disqualify to the presiding judge. 260 Finally, the court held that in view of
the belated nature of the filing and the broad discretion allowed trial courts
in family law matters, the error, if any, was harmless. 261
In Manges v. Martinez262 the court of appeals did not consider the untime-
liness of the motion, even though the motion was not filed until the day of
trial. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to refer
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (reprinted in U.S.C.S., CONVENTIONS, Convention
on the Taking of evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 523 (Law. Co-op. 1983).
251. 676 S.W.2d at 445.
252. Id.
253. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
254. Id. 18a(a).
255. Id. 18a(e).
256. Id. 18a(c), (d).
257. 677 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
258. Id. at 730; accord Autry v. Autry, 646 S.W.2d 586, 587-88 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983,
no writ).
259. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 6 (Vernon 1977), repealed by Act of June 13,
1985, ch. 480, § 26(1) & ch. 732, § 5(1), 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4085, 5309 (Vernon). The
court indicated that rule 18a may control the application of article 200a, § 6. If that is the
case, noncompliance with rule 18a also defeats a motion under article 200a, § 6. 677 S.W.2d at
731; see Limon v. State, 632 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. rerd).
260. 677 S.W.2d at 731.
261. Id.
262. 683 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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a motion to disqualify to the presiding judge due to the nature of the allega-
tions made in the motion. 263 In this regard the motion in Manges requested
that the trial judge voluntarily recuse himself due to his pecuniary relation-
ship with one of the plaintiff's attorneys. The court of appeals concluded
that the sole grounds for mandatory disqualification of a trial judge are
found in the Texas Constitution 264 and that the instant motion to disqualify
did not allege a basis for disqualification under the constitutional provi-
sion.2 6 5 The court ruled that as a result the trial court did not have to refer
the disqualification motion to the presiding judge since the movant had
failed to state appropriate grounds for mandatory disqualification. 266 The
court also upheld the trial court because the motion did not speak in terms
of mandatory disqualification but requested only a voluntary recusal.
2 6 7
In District Judges v. Commissioner's Court26 8 the court considered
whether (1) an order granting a motion to recuse is reviewable by appeal and
(2) whether the judge assigned to hear the motion to recuse after referral
may hear the trial on the merits of the case if recusal is granted. Based upon
the express language of rule 18a(f) 2 69 the court held that if a motion to re-
cuse is granted, the order is not reviewable by appeal. 270 The court also
ruled that the judge assigned to preside over the recusal motion is not barred
from thereafter hearing the case on the merits.2 71
X. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Disciplinary rule 5-102272 provides that an attorney who may be called as
a witness other than on behalf of his client may continue to represent his
client until it becomes apparent that the attorney's testimony is or may be
prejudicial to his client. In a suit involving a buy-sell agreement between
certain corporate shareholders, the defendants in Stocking v. Biery273 sought
to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel on the basis that he had represented the
purchasers in negotiating the agreement. Although the defendants had an-
nounced that they would call the plaintiff's counsel as a witness, the trial
court denied the motion for disqualification. In the ensuing mandamus pro-
263. Id. at 139.
264. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11. The constitutional grounds for disqualification are: (1) the
trial judge has an interest in the case; (2) the trial judge is connected to either of the parties by
affinity or consanguinity, as proscribed by law; or (3) the trial judge was counsel in the case.
Id.
265. 683 S.W.2d at 139.
266. Id.
267. Id. But see Greenburg, Fisk & Fiedler v. Howell, 676 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ) (trial court judge cannot rule on motion's procedural sufficiency; he must either
recuse himself or refer the motion).
268. 677 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
269. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(f) ("If the motion is granted, the order shall not be reviewable
.. .. .).
270. 677 S.W.2d at 745.
271. Id.
272. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art.
XII, § 8 (Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 5-102 (1973).
273. 677 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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ceeding the court of appeals recognized that the mere announcement by the
defendant that he intended to call the opposing counsel as a witness was
insufficient to require disqualification. 274 It must be further demonstrated
that the attorney's testimony would be material to the movant's defense and
prejudicial to his client's interests before disqualification would be or-
dered. 275 Reviewing the record, the court of appeals found no basis upon
which to reach a conclusion that the attorney's testimony was material as
well as prejudicial to the interests of his clients and, accordingly, refused to
issue a writ of mandamus. 276
Gleason v. Coman277 addressed issues related to the propriety of an attor-
ney acting as adverse counsel in a proceeding against his former client and
the proper mechanism by which to raise disqualification issues before the
court of appeals. Faced with a situation in which his former counsel in a
divorce action was now representing his wife in a second divorce case, the
husband sought to disqualify his former counsel. The husband's motion was
denied, and his subsequent appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The husband's separate action for an injunction against his former attorney
was also dismissed, leading to this appeal. 278 The court of appeals recog-
nized that a clear conflict of interest existed and applied the substantially
related test to determine whether the attorney could represent the wife. 279
Under the substantially related test, an attorney is disqualified if the movant
can show a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the attor-
ney's former representation and a subsequent adverse representation. 28 0
Although the court found that a substantial relationship had been shown,
it did not overturn the trial court's refusal to disqualify the attorney. 28' The
husband had sought to challenge the ruling by appealing on the basis that a
trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to enjoin the attorney from
further representation. Recognizing that an applicant for a temporary in-
junction must demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable injury or has no
adequate remedy at law, the court of appeals concluded that the proper pro-
cedure for testing the trial court's decision was by way of mandamus, rather
than by attempting to appeal the denial of a temporary injunction.282
Finally, Sloan v. Rivers283 considered the application of rule 12,284 which
274. Id. at 794.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 795.
277. 693 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
278. Id. at 565-66.
279. Id. at 566-67.
280. Id. at 566; accord Howard Hughes Medical Institute v. Lumis, 596 S.W.2d 171, 174
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
281. 693 S.W.2d at 567.
282. Id.; cf. Dillard v. Berryman, 683 S.W.2d 13, 15-16 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no
writ) (trial court abused its discretion in not enjoining attorney's continued representation);
Braun v. Valley Ear, Nose & Throat Specialists, 611 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (reviewed trial court's refusal to disqualify opposing counsel and
found no clear abuse of discretion).
283. 693 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
284. TEX. R. Civ. P. 12.
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governs the procedure used to challenge the authority of an attorney to rep-
resent parties in proceedings before Texas courts. After an injunction peti-
tion had been filed in the court of appeals in order to protect its jurisdiction
and preserve the subject matter of another pending appeal, an unverified
motion was filed under rule 12 challenging the authority of an attorney to
represent certain parties in the injunction proceeding. Although the court of
appeals recognized that rule 12 requires verification of a motion to strike, the
court concluded that the requirement of verification is waived when no ex-
ception is taken by the opposing party. 28 5 The court also ruled that the
challenge was properly made in the court of appeals because the injunction
proceeding originally commenced before that court.28 6 Given the admission
by the attorney in question that he did not have authority to represent the
parties, the motion was granted. 28
7
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A number of decisions during the survey period discussed the type of
proof that will support or defeat a motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiff in Sparks v. Cameron Employees Credit Union2 88 sought to collect
the balance due on a promissory note and filed a motion for summary judg-
ment asserting that the defendant's answer was insufficient in law to consti-
tute a defense to a cause of action, as shown by pleadings, pretrial discovery,
and affidavits on file with the court.2 8 9 The defendant had filed an answer in
which she claimed that the note had been paid in full by insurance policies
payable to the plaintiff. The defendant submitted an affidavit in support of
her answer that stated that the vehicle securing the note was stolen and she
assumed there was ample insurance coverage to pay the debt owed to the
plaintiff. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment. The defendant claimed on appeal that the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment did not set forth specific grounds in support of the motion as
required by rule 166-A(c). 290 The court of appeals disagreed and held that
the notice as to grounds required by rule 166-A was similar to the general
pleading requirements applicable to petitions and answers. 29' The court fur-
ther held that the defendant's controverting affidavit failed to raise a fact
issue because she had merely assumed the debt had been retired by the insur-
ance proceeds. 292
The court also considered certain attacks made by the defendant on the
285. 693 S.W.2d at 783, 784.
286. Id. at 784 (quoting Angelina County v. McFarlland, 374 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Tex.
1964)).
287. 693 S.W.2d at 785.
288. 678 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
289. Id. at 602.
290. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c) (motion for summary judgment shall state specific grounds
therefor).
291. 678 S.W.2d at 602; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 45(b), 47(a) (both requiring notice sufficient to
apprise party of claim).
292. 678 S.W.2d at 602.
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proof submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment. 293 The
defendant contended that the affidavits submitted in support of the motion
were insufficient because they simply stated an amount as the balance due
under the note and, according to the defendant, the statement was con-
clusory in nature. The court of appeals rejected this argument and found
that the statement of the balance due was competent summary judgment
evidence. 294 The defendant further argued that an affidavit relating to attor-
neys' fees merely contained an opinion and a fact issue as to such fees there-
fore existed. The defendant apparently failed to object to the affidavit at trial
and, accordingly, the court of appeals held that the defendant had waived
error with respect to the proof regarding attorney's fees. 29 5
In contrast, the appellate court in General Specialities Inc. v. Charter Na-
tional Bank-Houston296 held that an affidavit which contained a total bal-
ance due for seven promissory notes without a breakdown of principal and
interest was ambiguous and could not, therefore, form the basis of a sum-
mary judgment. 297 The court also found that a material issue of fact existed
with respect to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. 298 In this case, unlike
the Sparks case, the defendant had filed a controverting affidavit with respect
to those fees.
In Beaumont Enterprise & Journal v. Smith299 the supreme court dis-
cussed the sufficiency of summary judgment proof in a libel action against a
newspaper. In support of a motion for summary judgment, the defendant
reporter submitted an affidavit wherein she stated that she believed her arti-
cle about the plaintiff was factually accurate and true. Although recognizing
that in a libel action brought by a public official an element of the action is
that a false statement be made with actual malice, the supreme court deter-
mined that the reporter's affidavit was insufficient to support a summary
judgment. 300 The court noted that the reporter was an interested party and
that evidence as to the reporter's state of mind was not of a type that could
be readily controverted. 30 1 Accordingly, the court held that summary judg-
ment could not be sustained on the basis of the reporter's evidence because
rule 166-A provides that a summary judgment may be based on the uncon-
troverted testimony evidence of an interested party provided that the evi-
dence is " 'clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible ... and could have been
readily controverted.' "302
293. Id. at 603.
294. Id.; accord Ecurie Cerveza Racing Team, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 633 S.W.2d
574, 575 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
295. 678 S.W.2d at 603.
296. 687 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
297. Id. at 774.
298. Id.
299. 687 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1985).
300. Id. at 730.
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c)).
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XII. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
As trial practitioners are aware, Texas procedure allows the trial court to
submit special issues broadly rather than by separate questions with respect
to each element of a case. 303 In recent years the supreme court has strongly
indicated its preference for the broad submission form. 3°4 Island Recrea-
tional Development Corp. v. Republic of Texas Savings Association,30 5 a re-
cent decision of the Texas Supreme Court, may indicate a reversal in that
trend. In this suit involving a claim for breach of a loan commitment, the
trial court had submitted an issue inquiring whether the plaintiff had per-
formed its obligations under the commitment letter in question. The jury
answered in the affirmative. It was apparently undisputed, however, that the
plaintiff had not filed a loan application within a certain time deadline as
required by the commitment. The court of appeals thus held that the plain-
tiff had failed to satisfy a condition precedent and judgment should have
been rendered for the defendant. 30 6 On review by the supreme court, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was estopped from asserting or had
waived the condition. Since the plaintiff had not complained on appeal
about the trial court's refusal to submit waiver and estoppel issues, the
supreme court concluded that waiver or estoppel had to be established as a
matter of law for the plaintiff to prevail and the record did not support such
a finding. 307 A vigorous dissent argued that the issue submitted to the jury
subsumed any questions about waiver and estoppel and the majority's hold-
ing was thus contrary to prior decisions favoring broad submission. 30 8
Two cases during the survey period concerned the use of a separate in-
struction to place the burden of proof on the proper party. Recognizing that
the trial court has the discretion to place the burden of proof in this fashion,
the court of appeals in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Olivarez30 9
found error in such a submission stating that "[a] 'yes' answer must be based
on a preponderance of evidence." In support of its holding, the appellate
court noted that the first special issue, which inquired about the date and
nature of an injury, could not be answered "yes" or "no" and, accordingly,
the instruction did not properly place the burden of proof.310
In Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico3 1 1 the trial court had given a gen-
eral instruction that every finding by the jury must be made by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Thereafter, an issue was submitted that asked whether
the defendants had acted in bad faith in breaching the contract with the
plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the instruction and issue were am-
303. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
304. See Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984) (reiterating supreme court
approval of broad issue submission).
305. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 534 (July 3, 1985).
306. Id. at 534.
307. Id. at 535.
308. Id. at 535-39 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
309. 694 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
310. Id. at 94.
311. 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ rerd n.r.e.).
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biguous in that the jury was possibly misled to believe that it must base both
a positive and a negative answer on a preponderance of the evidence. 312
Since the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's bad faith, only
a positive answer required a finding on a preponderance of the evidence. 313
The ambiguity was held to constitute reversible error and the breach of con-
tract issue was thus remanded to the trial court. 314
On the basis of rule 277,315 Texas courts have ruled that instructions are
permitted when they are necessary to aid the jury in its deliberations. 316 The
trial court in Mader v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.317 found that as a matter
of law the plaintiff was not a consumer within the meaning of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.318 The trial court subsequently instructed the jury con-
cerning the legal ruling in connection with an issue that inquired whether
the plaintiff's claim under the Act was brought in bad faith or for purposes
of harassment. The court of appeals concluded that the instruction was an
impermissible comment on the evidence and was unnecessary for considera-
tion of the issue submitted. 319 Similarly, in American Petrofina, Inc. v. PPG
Industries320 the trial court instructed the jury as to the relation of the par-
ties and their obligations regarding the delivery of diesel fuel. The court of
appeals held the instructions erroneous since they were unnecessary to aid
the jury in deciding an issue about conversion of the fuel and were impermis-
sible comments on the weight of the evidence. 32' Finally, in K-Mart Corp. v.
Trotti322 the court of appeals ruled that, in an invasion of privacy action, the
definitions of "invasion of privacy" and "mental anguish" were technical,
legal terms that required definition in the charge. 323 The charge in Trotti did
not contain the required definitions, and the case was thus reversed. 324
Although denying an application for writ of error, the supreme court refused
to approve the lower court's holding that "mental anguish" was a term re-
quiring definition. 325
The defendant in Shell Oil Co. v. Chapman326 appealed from a judgment
based on jury findings in the same dollar amount for claims of negligence
and deceptive trade practices. The defendant argued that the award of dam-
312. Id. at 441-42.
313. Id. at 441-42 (quoting Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. King, 138 Tex. 473, 475, 161
S.W.2d 483, 483-84 (1942)).
314. '696 S.W.2d at 442.
315. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (court can submit explanatory instructions to aid jury in render-
ing verdict).
316. See Board of Regents v. Denton Constr. Co., 652 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
317. 683 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
318. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.826 (1979).
319. 683 S.W.2d at 733-34.
320. 679 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd).
321. Id. at 757.
322. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam,
686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985).
323. 677 S.W.2d at 636, 639.
324. Id. at 637, 639.
325. 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985).
326. 682 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1984).
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ages based on a total of the two findings constituted a double recovery. The
supreme court disagreed, stating that the damage issues were predicated on
separate claims and the defendant failed to preserve its point of error by not
objecting to the issues or requesting an issue to prevent any double
recovery. 327
The form of objections to the charge was the subject of two recent cases.
In Spellman v. American Universal Investment Co.,328 a suit to rescind or
reform a deed, the plaintiff complained that a take-nothing judgment could
not be based on adverse findings of ratification with respect to the reforma-
tion claim because ratification had been pleaded as a defense to the recission
claim only. The court of appeals noted that rule 274329 requires that objec-
tions to an issue must distinctly point out the defective matter. 330 Since
plaintiff's general objection to the ratification issue failed to point out defend-
ant's lack of pleading on the reformation claim, plaintiff failed to preserve
the error for appeal. 331
The appellant in Vick v. George332 failed to participate in the trial, but
sought to object orally to the charge after the close of the evidence. Despite
allowing the other parties to object orally before a court reporter, the trial
court refused to allow the appellant to follow that procedure. The trial court
instead required that the appellant submit his objections in writing, which
appellant failed to do before the charge was submitted to the jury. The court
of appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring
written objections from appellant and that any objections were waived be-
cause they were not submitted before the charge was read to the jury. 333
XIII. JURY PRACTICE
Rule 216 provides that a demand for a jury be made and the necessary fee
paid "on or before appearance day or, if thereafter, a reasonable time before
the date set for trial of the cause on the non-jury docket, but not less than ten
days in advance."'334 In Huddle v. Huddle335 one of the litigants paid a jury
fee more than ten days prior to the trial setting, but did not make a jury
request until the day before such setting. Affirming the trial court's denial
of a jury trial, the supreme court held that the time limitations contained in
rule 216 apply not only to the time that a jury fee must be deposited, but also
"apply with equal force to the application for jury trial. 336
In Daley v. Wheat 337 the trial court granted the appellant a jury trial in a
327. Id. at 259.
328. 687 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
329. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274.
330. 687 S.W.2d at 32.
331. Id.
332. 696 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
333. Id. at 162.
334. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
335. 696 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1985).
336. Id. at 895; see also Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 877 (Tex. 1968)
(demand made 10 days in advance is not always timely).
337. 681 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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statutory probate court. The appellant maintained, however, that she had
been denied her constitutional right to equal protection because the case was
tried before six jurors, rather than twelve jurors as permitted in district
court. The appellant argued that section 5 of the Probate Code338 was un-
constitutional because it allows contested probate matters filed in counties
without statutory probate courts to be heard by the district courts. The ap-
pellant complained that the effect of such legislation was to permit probate
litigants to receive district court trials with twelve jurors in less populated
counties while limiting the right of probate litigants in larger counties with
statutory probate courts to juries composed of only six jurors. Rejecting this
contention, the appellate court noted that legislation limited in operation to
only a portion of the state or prescribing different rules for a distinct geo-
graphical area does not deny equal protection when a reasonable basis for
the distinction exists and "all persons similarly situated in the same place are
equally treated. ' 339 The court thus held that section 5 is constitutional. 340
The court also found that the appellant had waived her right to complain
about this matter on appeal because she had requested a jury trial and had
waited until after an adverse verdict before making objection to the number
of jurors hearing the case. 34 1
A number of courts during the survey period addressed questions related
to challenges to jurors, either for cause or as peremptory challenges. In Hal-
lett v. Houston Northwest Medical Center3 42 the supreme court set forth the
procedure that a litigant must follow in order to preserve error with respect
to a challenge for cause. The court stated that a litigant who believes that a
district court has improperly denied a challenge for cause to a prospective
juror must, prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges, advise the trial
court of two things: "(1) that he would exhaust his peremptory challenges;
and (2) that after exercising his peremptory challenge, specific objectionable
jurors would remain on the jury list." 34 3 Absent such notice, the litigant
waives any error committed by the trial court in refusing to discharge jurors
who are challenged for cause.344
As noted in the previous survey,345 rule 233 now provides that in mul-
tiparty cases the trial court must first decide whether any of the litigants
aligned on the same side of the docket are antagonistic with respect to any
issue to be submitted to the jury and, in the event of a finding of antagonism,
may grant additional peremptory challenges in order to equalize the chal-
lenges available to the parties. 346 In a personal injury action against two
338. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon 1984).
339. 681 S.W.2d at 758.
340. Id.
341. Id.; accord Mouton v. State, 627 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981,
no writ).
342. 689 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. 1985).
343. Id. at 890.
344. Id.
345. See 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 112, at 452.
346. TEX. R. Civ. P. 233.
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defendants, the plaintiff in Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc. 347 claimed that the
trial court had improperly allowed the two defendants more than six per-
emptory challenges between them. The two defendants had filed cross-ac-
tions against each other for contribution and indemnity, but they had not
claimed that either defendant's conduct was the sole cause of the plaintiff's
injury. Recognizing that questions of indemnity, contribution, and subroga-
tion are generally questions of law, 348 the court of appeals determined that
there was no antagonism among the defendants with respect to an issue of
fact that would be submitted to the jury. 349 Accordingly, the appellate court
held the the trial court had committed error in allowing additional peremp-
tory challenges to the two defendants. 350 The court nonetheless determined
that the error was not so materially unfair as to require reversal because it
determined that the evidence with respect to the negligence was not conflict-
ing enough to warrant a new trial. 35' The court of appeals also found no
merit in the appellant's complaint that the defendants exercised their per-
emptory challenges to exclude Hispanics.352 The record on appeal demon-
strated, however, that at least three of the jurors serving bore Hispanic
surnames. The court of appeals thus held that the appellant failed to carry
the burden of demonstrating that jurors were excluded solely on the basis of
race. 353
In connection with peremptory challenges and multiparty litigation, Sisco
v. Hereford354 considered generally the right of co-parties to confer with
each other in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Although the court of
appeals recognized that parties to a multiparty lawsuit may confer with each
other in the exercise of peremptory challenges, it also stated that the issue of
whether multi-defendants were to be permitted or denied collaboration in
the exercise of such challenges is addressed to the trial court's discretion and
is subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion. 355
Finally, the courts continue to grapple with issues concerning the scope of
jury argument. Appealing an adverse result involving claims of deceptive
trade practices and fraud, the appellant in American Petrofina, Inc. v. PPG
Industries, Inc.356 claimed that statements made by the plaintiff's counsel
that compared the case to a criminal proceeding were improper jury argu-
ment and resulted in an excessive jury award. The plaintiff's counsel had
stated in closing argument: (1) that the defendants were "just going to com-
mit a little bit of white-collar crime"; (2) "down the hall they're trying some
347. 699 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
348. See Employers Cas. Co. v. Peterson, 609 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, no writ) (claim for contribution or indemnity must fall under some legal theory).
349. 699 S.W.2d at 234.
350. Id. at 235.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.; see Garcia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 622 S.W.2d 626, 630-31 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (plaintiff must prove systematic and arbitrary discrimination).
354. 694 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
355. Id. at 8-9.
356. 679 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd).
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fellow for stealing $43 to send him to the penitentiary"; (3) you can't send
[the defendant] to Huntsville"; and (4) "[i]s it right to let [the defendants] go
free to take something that belongs to [the plaintiff]"; and "[c]an you say, 'I
have been a just juror,' when juries that have sat in these very chairs before
you have sent people to the penitentiary for stealing . . . . -7 The defend-
ants objected to this argument and moved for a mistrial. The court of ap-
peals found that any analogy in a civil action made to criminal conduct was
improper.358 The court also held that closing argument statements by the
plaintiff's counsel concerning improper grammar used by opposing counsel
in closing argument was an attack upon the professional ethics and integrity
of counsel and could not be condoned. 359 The court of appeals concluded
that the plaintiff's counsel's closing argument was sufficiently improper to
constitute reversible error. 360 Similarly, in In re Knighton161 the court in a
custody dispute held that a final argument by the husband's attorney that
the jury should deprive the wife of managing conservatorship rights because
of her religious beliefs constituted prejudicial error. 362 The husband's attor-
ney had referred to the wife as being a member of a cult designed to collect
money and that the jury should not condemn the two children to that kind
of life and to "figuratively being burned at the stake. '363
In contrast, the defendant's counsel in Plains Insurance Co. v. Evans364
had referred to the plaintiff as the " 'worst insurance company I have ever
seen' " and further stated that " 'I am ashamed that they're permitted to sell
insurance in the State of Texas . ... " ,365 Notwithstanding the improper
nature of such argument, the court of appeals held that it was not grounds
for reversal because the defendant's counsel invited the remarks by telling
the jury that his company was " 'a good company' " and that he was "proud
to be their lawyer." '366
Rule 286 provides that the court may give additional instructions to the
jury after their retirement and that, in the event additional instruction is
provided, the trial court has the discretion to allow additional arguments. 367
In Vantage Management Co. v. Vision Industries Corp. 368 the trial court sub-
mitted additional issues to the jury after they had retired for deliberation.
The additional submission was in response to a note about a related issue.
The defendant objected to the submission of this new issue, claiming it re-
quired new argument. Using its own discretion, the trial court overruled the
357. Id. at 754.
358. Id. at 755; accord International Harvester Co. v. Zavala, 623 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
359. 679 S.W.2d at 755.
360. Id. at 756; see Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 1979)
(complainant must prove that opponent's argument constituted harmful error).
361. 685 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
362. Id. at 722.
363. Id. at 721.
364. 692 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
365. Id. at 958.
366. Id.
367. TEX. R. Civ. P. 286.
368. 689 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no writ).
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objection without permitting additional argument. Reversing the trial
court's judgment, the court of appeals held that the revised issue was, in
effect, a new and different issue and that appellant should have been allowed
to present argument to the jury concerning the new issue. 369
XIV. JUDGMENTS, DISMISSALS, AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc. v. TindalP70 serves as a warning to trial at-
torneys who rely on their staff to monitor notices from the trial court. Ap-
pealing from a judgment that dismissed its cause of action for want of
prosecution, the plaintiff contended that it had not received proper notice of
the proposed dismissal. The record demonstrated that the trial court had
sent a notice of dismissal to the appellant's law firm that specifically listed
the number and style of the case in question. Further, the defendant demon-
strated that the form of notice was the usual method employed by the clerk
and was not new or unfamiliar to the law firm. The notice was handled by
the firm's docket secretary, who apparently never informed the attorney
handling the case of the court's intent to dismiss the action for want of pros-
ecution. Despite the law firm's claim that no attorney had been given notice,
the court of appeals held that receipt of the notice by the law firm's docket
secretary was sufficient. 37 1 Further, the court construed the meaning of "at-
torney of record" and determined that such term includes a "law firm as a
whole," as opposed to individual attorneys in the firm.3 72 The court there-
fore held that a notice addressed to a law firm representing a party was suffi-
cient notice to the attorney of record of the trial court's intent to dismiss for
want of prosecution, irrespective of whether the notice was addressed to an
individual attorney at the firm. 373
Although raised in a slightly different context, the sufficiency of a notice
was also addressed in Wilson v. Industrial Leasing Corp. 374 In Wilson the
appellant contended that it had not received notice of a trial setting. The
appellant thus argued that a judgment resulting from nonappearance was
erroneous. In the ensuing writ of error proceeding, the court of appeals held
that, notwithstanding a recitation in the judgment that notice of the trial
setting was provided to the defendant, the recitation could be rebutted by
other evidence in the record and the record demonstrated that the defendant
had not received actual or constructive notice of the trial setting. 375
Finally, the supreme court in Philbrook v. Berry37 6 addressed questions
arising from the filing of a motion for new trial when the original action had
369. Id. at 492; accord Boler v. Coughran, 304 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1957, writ refd).
370. 683 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
371. Id. at 598.
372. Id. at 599; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 10 (defining attorney of record); id. 165a (court can
dismiss case for failure to take action within 15 days of mailing of notice of intent to dismiss
for want of prosecution); id. 306a (discussing relationship of notice to running of time periods).
373. 683 S.W.2d at 599.
374. 689 S.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
375. Id. at 498.
376. 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985).
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been severed into different causes. In this case an original products liability
action had been brought against several defendants, but a severance was
granted with respect to the plaintiff's claims against one of the defendants.
Thereafter, the court awarded the plaintiff a default judgment in the severed
cause and the defendant filed a motion for new trial after becoming aware of
the default judgment. The defendant filed the motion, however, in the origi-
nal cause rather than in the severed cause. Notwithstanding this misfiling,
the trial court considered the motion and entered an order granting a new
trial within fifty-three days after the default judgment was entered. The
supreme court recognized that in the absence of a timely motion for new
trial, the court retains plenary power over its judgment for a period of thirty
days, as opposed to the possible 105-day period in the event a timely motion
for new trial is filed. 377 The supreme court ruled that because the motion for
new trial was filed in the wrong cause, it did not operate to extend the
court's plenary power over its judgment beyond the thirty days prescribed in
rule 329b.378 Accordingly, the court held that the trial court lacked power
to set aside the judgment except by bill of review. 379
XV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Although the rules governing appellate procedure sustained no major
changes during the survey period, the supreme court did make several note-
worthy revisions. An appellate party desiring oral argument in the court of
appeals must now file a specific request for oral argument at the time he files
his brief in the case. 380 Rule 423 previously permitted any party filing a brief
to submit an oral or written argument when the court called the case for
submission.38' Under the amended rule, written arguments are apparently
no longer permitted, and failure to make a specific request for argument
constitutes a waiver of oral argument. 382 If a party waives his right to argu-
ment under rule 423, the court of appeals may nevertheless direct that party
to appear and submit argument upon submission of the case. 383 The court
may also advance submission of the case without argument if, in its discre-
tion, argument would not materially aid the court in determining the issues
presented in the appeal. 384 Finally, while former rule 423 allowed the court
to extend the time for argument in cases involving difficult questions, the
amended rule now also permits the court to exercise its discretion in shorten-
ing the time permitted for oral argument. 385
Minor changes were also made with respect to the rules governing prepa-
377. Id. at 379; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b (addressing motions for new trial and the court's
plenary power).
378. 683 S.W.2d at 379; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
379. 683 S.W.2d at 379.
380. TEX. R. Civ. P. 423(0.
381. TEx. R. Civ. P. 423(a) (West 1984).
382. TEX. R. Civ. P. 423(a), (f).
383. Id. 423(0.
384. Id. In such a case, the clerk is required to give all parties or their attorneys notice that
the case is being submitted without argument at least 21 days prior to the submission date. Id.
385. Id. 423(d).
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ration of the transcript and the statement of facts. The clerk preparing the
transcript must now deliver it directly to the appropriate court of appeals,
rather than to the party who requested it. 3 8 6 Further, amended rule 377
requires the court reporter to include his certification number, business ad-
dress, telephone number, and expiration date of certification in the certificate
accompanying the statement of facts. 38 7
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Central Bank388 is a warning to parties who
succeed in obtaining a judgment non obstante veredicto to preserve for ap-
peal all grounds supporting the judgment. In that case the defendant ob-
tained a jury finding supporting one of its affirmative defenses. The plaintiff
argued that the defense was not properly raised by the pleadings and that
there was no evidence to support the jury's finding. Agreeing with the plain-
tiff's latter contention, the trial court disregarded the jury finding and en-
tered judgment n.o.v. in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant,
however, the court of appeals found some evidence to support the jury's
finding. 389 With respect to the plaintiff's alternative contention that the de-
fense was not raised properly by the pleadings, the court noted that rule
324390 required the plaintiff to assign its no-pleadings complaint as a cross-
point that would vitiate the verdict. 39' Nevertheless, because the plaintiff
had actually raised the issue on appeal, but simply mislabelled its argument
as a reply point, the court liberally construed the plaintiff's brief and chose
to consider the point anyway. 392 After concluding that the defendant's
pleadings sufficiently raised the affirmative defense, the court was compelled
to render judgment for the defendant since the plaintiff failed to preserve an
issue raising factual insufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury's
finding. 393
A number of decisions considered questions related to filing deadlines in
the courts of appeals. In Monk v. Dallas Brake & Clutch Service Co. 394 the
court of appeals granted the appellant's motion to extend the time for filing
the statement of facts even though the appellant had failed to request prepa-
ration of the statement "at or before the time for perfecting the appeal" as
required by rule 377.395 After analyzing recent amendments to the various
rules governing time periods on appeal, the court concluded that a failure to
make a written request within the time prescribed by rule 377(a) could be
excused under rule 21c if reasonably explained. 396 Finding that the appel-
lant's late request did not delay the preparation and filing of the statement of
386. Id. 376-a(g).
387. Id. 377(e).
388. 672 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
389. Id. at 650.
390. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(c).
391. 672 S.W.2d at 645.
392. Id. at 646; see TEX. R. Cv. P. 422 (briefing rules to be liberally construed).
393. 672 S.W.2d at 650 n.I.
394. 683 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
395. Id. at 108; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(a).
396. 683 S.W.2d at 109; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c (court of appeals may grant extension of
filing time upon reasonable explanation).
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facts, the court held that the appellant's delay was reasonably explained, as
required by rule 21c. 397 As noted by the supreme court in Coulson v. Lake
LBJ Municipal Utility District,398 this reasonable explanation standard,
which appears throughout the amended appellate rules, is less stringent than
the good cause standard applicable before 1981.399 A reasonable explana-
tion requires only a plausible statement of circumstances indicating that a
party's failure to file within the required period was not deliberate or inten-
tional but resulted from inadvertence or mistake.40 0
Resolving a conflict in the courts of appeals, 401 the supreme court held in
Chojnacki v. The Court of Appeals for the First Supreme Judicial District40 2
that the requirements of rule 21c are not limited to initial motions for an
extension of time to file the transcript or statement of facts.40 3 The Supreme
Court thus held that the court of appeals lacked authority to grant the appel-
lant's third motion for an extension of time to file the statement of facts since
the motion was filed more than fifteen days after the statement of facts was
due.404
The court in Moody House, Inc. v. Galveston County40 5 held that a party
prosecuting an independent appeal cannot simply rely on rule 428406 and
supplement the record filed by his opponent in order to include those por-
tions of the record relevant to his own appeal. 40 7 Instead, the cross-appel-
lant must comply with the pertinent timing requirements set forth in the
rules for filing his own record. 40 8
Mandamus procedures continue to be the subject of judicial scrutiny. Ac-
cording to the court in Superior Trans-Med, Inc. v. Hall,40 9 mandamus is not
an appropriate remedy for the" 'thicket' of incidental pre-trial rulings which
appellate courts cannot enter without serious disruption of the orderly pro-
397. 683 S.W.2d at 109. The court's holding accorded with its earlier decision in Moore v.
Davis, 644 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ). But see Odom v. Olafson, 675
S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (court has no discretion to allow
statement to be filed by appellant who does not comply with rule 377(a)).
398. 678 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1984).
399. Id. at 944; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 414 comment (noting change from good cause to
reasonable explanation standard); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Dalton, 602 S.W.2d 130, 131
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ) (explaining good cause standard).
400. 678 S.W.2d at 944.
401. Compare Better Construction, Inc. v. H.E. Reeves, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (appellate court lacks authority to grant third motion for
extension if not filed timely under rule 21c) with Gibralter Sav. Ass'n v. Hamilton Air Mart,
Inc., 662 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (court has jurisdiction to con-
sider second motion for an extension even though filed 15 days after time allowed).
402. 699 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1985).
403. Id. at 194.
404. Id. (citing B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1982),
discussed in 1983 Annual Survey, supra note 85, at 319); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c (imposing
15-day deadline on filing of motion to extend).
405. 687 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
406. TEX. R. Civ. P. 428 permits the filing of a supplemental record to supply matter
material to either party that was omitted from the transcript or statement of facts.
407. 687 S.W.2d at 435.
408. Id. at 436.
409. 683 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
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cess of trial and appeals. '4 °1 0 As a result, the court refused to interfere with a
trial court's order directing a defendant to respond to requests for admis-
sions aimed at the defendant's alternative defenses. 4 '' In Bailey v. Baker4 12
the court denied the relator's motion for leave to file a petition for writ of
mandamus since he did not file his motion until two weeks before the date
set for trial. 41 3 Although the court commented favorably on the merits of
the relator's motion, it could find no explanation for his long delay in seek-
ing a remedy by way of mandamus. 41 4 Finally, the court in Parks v. Hop-
kins41 5 denied an application for writ of mandamus because the relator failed
to attach to his petition a copy of the allegedly erroneous trial court order.41 6
The court stated that because of that omission the relator had failed to com-
ply with the procedural prerequisites for filing a mandamus. 41 7
Two decisions during the survey period concerned parties. In George v.
Vick 41 8 no party appealed from a trial court's judgment insofar as it disposed
of actions by and against certain defendants. Accordingly, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's judgment as to those defendants and reversed
the court of appeals' judgment, which remanded the entire case for a new
trial. 4 19 Jernigan v. Jernigan,420 after acknowledging that appeals are gener-
ally available only to parties of record, held that trust beneficiaries bound by
a trial court's judgment had standing to file an appeal even though they were
not named in the judgment. 42' The court in Jernigan recognized that past
decisions had afforded a right to appeal to nonparties under the doctrine of
virtual representation. 422
Rule 377(d) permits a party to file a partial statement of facts on appeal so
long as the party's request for the partial statement of facts includes a listing
of the points of error that he will rely on for appeal. 423 If the appellant
410. Id. at 498 (citing Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 997 (1970)).
411. Id. According to the court, the case could be reversed on appeal and remanded if the
trial court's ruling improperly deprived the defendant of presenting an alternative defense. Id.
at 497.
412. 696 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
413. Id. at 256.
414. Id. Since the discovery complaint related to production of records, the court con-
cluded that the records could be subpoenaed for trial and, if the trial court again refused to
order disclosure, a sufficient record could be made for appellate review. Id.
415. 677 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
416. Id. at 792.
417. Id. TEX. R. Civ. P. 383(1)(b)(4) provides that the petition for writ of mandamus shall
be accompanied by a certified or sworn copy of the order complained of and other relevant
exhibits.
418. 686 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
419. Id. at 100.
420. 677 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
421. Id. at 140.
422. Id.; see, e.g., Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. 1965) (petitioner has
right to appeal when party to suit purported to represent him); California & Hawaiian Sugar
Co. v. Bunge Corp., 593 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ)
(test is whether trial court's judgment binds petitioner due to fact that a party to the suit
represented him); Grizzaffi v. Lee, 517 S.W.2d 885, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
writ dism'd) (virtual representation can bind a party).
423. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(d).
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complies with the requirements of this rule, it is presumed that nothing
omitted from the record is relevant to the points specified. 424 As the appel-
lant in Watson v. State425 learned the hard way, however, an opposite pre-
sumption applies when the appellant ignores the strictures of rule 377. In
Watson the court presumed that the omitted portions of the record fully
supported the judgment because the appellant filing the partial statement of
facts did not file a statement of the points that he intended to rely on for
appeal. 426
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. As part of Texas's continuing statutory
revision program, 427 the Sixty-Ninth Legislature enacted the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code during the survey period.42 8 The new Code,
effective September 1, 1985, collects, renumbers, and rearranges numerous
statutes formerly addressing venue, limitations, and other trial matters; 429
judgments; 430 appeals; 43 1 attachment, sequestation, injunctions, and other
extraordinary remedies;4 32 wrongful death, survival, and other matters in-
volving tort liability;433 government liability;4 34 and various miscellaneous
provisions.4 35 Although the new Code also eliminates those statutory provi-
sions that were duplicative, unconstitutional, or expired, and restates the law
in "modern American English, ' 4 36 it attempts only to recodify existing law
and effects no substantive changes. 4 3 7
Attorney's Fees and Costs. Article 2226 allows a party in certain cases to
recover its attorney's fees if payment for the amount owing on that party's
claim has not been tendered within thirty days after presentment of the
claim. 438 Until recently the courts of appeals had almost uniformly denied
attorney's fees under the statute to a party whose recovery on its claim was
more than offset by an opponent's recovery on a counterclaim. 439 Disap-
424. Id.
425. 687 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
426. Id. at 53.
427. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 1.001 (Vernon Pam. 1986). The program
of revision was begun by the Texas Legislative Council in 1963 and contemplates a topic-by-
topic revision of the state's general and permanent statute law without substantive change. Id.;
see TEX. GOV'T CODE § 323.007 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
428. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 7043 (enacting TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. (Vernon Pam. 1986)).
429. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001-30.003 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
430. Id. §§ 31.001-38.006.
431. Id. §§ 51.001-.014.
432. Id. §§ 61.001-66.003.
433. Id. §§ 71.001-79.002.
434. Id. §§ 101.001-106.003.
435. Id. §§ 121.001-129.003.
436. Id. § 1.001(b).
437. Id. § 1.001(a).
438. Act of June 6, 1979, ch. 314, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 718, 718, repealed and recodi-
fled as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 38.001-.006 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
439. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Deck Masters, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, no writ) (winning party cannot claim attorney's fees when claim is less than
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proving this line of authority, the supreme court in McKinley v. Drozd44 °
held that a plaintiff who successfully prosecuted his claim under article 2226
could recover his attorney's fees even though the defendant recovered a
greater amount on his counterclaim. 44 1 The court reasoned that a 1977
amendment to article 2226 authorized recovery of attorney's fees for any just
claim and, as a result, prior cases recognizing a net recovery requirement in
the earlier wording of article 2226 were no longer authoritative. 442 Accord-
ing to the court, the justness of a claim within article 2226 is not dependent
upon the outcome of other claims or counterclaims joined in the lawsuit. 443
For analogous reasons, the court further held that a consumer can recover
his attorney's fees incurred in the successful prosecution of a Deceptive
Trade Practices Act claim 444 whether or not he ultimately obtains a net re-
covery in the lawsuit. 44 5
Buffalo Title of Houston, Inc. v. House4 4 6 addressed the problem of allo-
cating attorney's fees among various claims, which often arises in proving
the amount of recoverable attorney's fees. Appealing from an adverse judg-
ment that allowed recovery under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the
appellant claimed that the trial court had erred in awarding attorney's fees
because the appellee's attorney failed to differentiate the time spent on causes
of action for which attorney's fees were recoverable from those for which no
attorney's fees could be recovered. Distinguishing the case from an earlier
decision that involved several distinct theories for which no overlap in prep-
aration existed, 4 4 7 the court concluded that allocation was not required since
the various theories that the appellee advanced were closely related. 448
defendant's); Greene v. Bearden Enterprises, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 649, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contractor cannot recover attorney's fees when owner's success-
ful counterclaim is greater); LQ Motor Inns v. Boysen, 503 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (unjust to award attorney's fees to party whose
claim is less than opponent's counterclaim). But cf Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications,
Inc., 653 S.W.2d 532, 538-39 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ) (questioning net recovery
requirement).
440. 685 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. 1985).
441. Id. at 10.
442. Id. (citing Figari, Graves & Gordon, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 435, 468-69 (1982)).
443. 685 S.W.2d at 11. The court noted additionally that, while courts formerly construed
art. 2226 strictly, the amendment to the statute mandated a liberal construction. Id.
444. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides that any
consumer who prevails on his DTPA claim shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees.
445. 685 S.W.2d at 9 (overruling Widmar v. Stamps, 663 S.W.2d 875, 882-83 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ), and Birds Constr., Inc. v. McKay, 657 S.W.2d 514, 516
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ)).
446. No. B14-82-652-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], June 14, 1984, no writ) (un-
published). Note that TEX. R. Civ. P. 452 expressly forbids citation of unpublished opinions
as authority.
447. See Kosberg v. Brown, 601 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1980, no writ) (party asserting a cause of action has duty to segregate fees connected with
causes of action for which attorney's fees are recoverable from those for which they are not
recoverable).
448. No. B14-82-652-CV, slip op. at 9; accord Schepps Grocery Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,
635 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ), discussed in 1983 Annual
Survey, supra note 85, at 322-23.
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Finally, Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc.449 held that a trial court's assess-
ment of costs against a prevailing party cannot be disturbed on appeal absent
a showing of abuse of discretion.450 Rule 131 provides that the successful
party to a suit shall recover all costs from his adversary unless otherwise
provided. 451 A corollary to that rule, according to the court, is rule 141,452
which permits a court to adjudge costs differently for good cause as shown
on the face of the record. 453 After finding evidence in the record to support
the trial court's determination that the defendant's trial strategy unnecessa-
rily increased costs by prolonging the trial, the supreme court concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs against the
successful defendant. 45
4
Prejudgment Interest. Acknowledging past criticism of the rationale under-
lying the distinction between liquidated and unliquidated damages as a basis
for awarding prejudgment interest, 4 55 the supreme court in Cavnar v. Qual-
ity Control Parking, Inc. 456 revised the Texas prejudgment interest rule. 45 7
Overruling a long line of authority, 458 the court held as a matter of law that
a prevailing plaintiff in a personal injury case could recover prejudgment
interest on damages that had accrued by the time of judgment. 459 As noted
by the court, courts had previously allowed prejudgment interest on both
liquidated and unliquidated claims in all cases except personal injury, and no
logical basis existed for distinguishing between such suits. 460 According to
the court, therefore, the revised prejudgment interest rule would restore eq-
uity and symmetry to this area of the law by making injured parties
whole.
4 6 1
Under the Cavnar rule prejudgment interest, compounded daily, accrues
at the prevailing rate that exists on the date judgment is rendered according
to the provisions of article 5069-1.05, section 2.462 In order to avoid diffi-
culty in determining from what date this rate of interest should accrue, the
449. 686 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1985).
450. Id. at 601.
451. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131.
452. TEX. R. Civ. P. 141.
453. 686 S.W.2d at 601.
454. Id.
455. See Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1933) (criticizing difference as
unsound).
456. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
457. Id. at 551-55.
458. See, e.g., Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Carr, 91 Tex. 332, 334, 43 S.W. 18, 18 (1897) (court
will not allow interest for period between dates of injury and judgment); Watkins v. Junker, 90
Tex. 584, 587, 40 S.W. 11, 12 (1897) (courts cannot grant interest in personal injury suits);
State v. Weller, 666 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e per
curiam, 682 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1984) (awarding prejudgment interest in personal injury suits is
erroneous).
459. 696 S.W.2d at 554.
460. Id. at 553.
461. Id. at 553-54.
462. Id. at 554; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1986)




court adopted two arbitrary accrual methods that it believed would most
closely approach the goal of full compensation for plaintiffs. 4 63 First, inter-
est in wrongful death and nondeath personal injury cases begins to accrue
from a date six months after the incident giving rise to the cause of action. 464
Interest in survival actions, on the other hand, accrues from the date of
death, unless the decedent lingers for more than six months after the injury-
causing incident, in which case the method selected for wrongful death ac-
tions again applies. 465 Prejudgment interest is recoverable only with respect
to damages awarded for past losses.4 66 Consequently, the Cavnar court also
held that the decedent's children could not recover any prejudgment interest
on a lump sum awarded them for both past and future losses since they
failed to tender jury issues segregating these categories of damages. 467
Following the rule posited in Cavnar, the supreme court in Monsanto Co.
v. Johnson4 68 denied prejudgment interest to a plaintiff in a wrongful death
action who failed to segregate future damages from damages that preceded
the date of trial. 469 Both Cavnar and Monsanto also held that prejudgment
interest is not allowable on punitive damages. 470
Res Judicata. Jeanes v. Henderson4 71 considered the effect of a prior federal
court judgment on a subsequent declaratory judgment action brought in a
state district court. In this case the plaintiff sued two defendants seeking a
determination of her royalty rights under certain mineral leases. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff sought a declaration that certain oil and gas options that
one of the defendants purportedly granted to her also bound another defend-
ant who subsequently purchased the lease in question. The plaintiff also
sued the second defendant, claiming that he tortiously interfered with the
option contract between her and the first defendant. Both defendants re-
sponded that res judicata barred the suit since the plaintiff had earlier sued
the first defendant in federal court on the same contract and lost on her
damage claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty.
After the trial court rendered a summary judgment for the defendants, the
plaintiff appealed, asserting that res judicata did not apply because the de-
claratory judgment suit involved a different cause of action from the federal
court litigation. The plaintiff also argued that the federal court would not
have exercised its pendant jurisdiction over her state-related declaratory
judgment claim and, therefore, she had not split her cause of action and later
asserted a claim that she could have litigated in the first instance. Employ-




467. Id. at 556.
468. 696 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1985) (decided on same day as Cavnar).
469. Id. at 559.
470. Id.; Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 556.
471. 688 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1985).
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ing the Fifth Circuit's primary right test,472 the supreme court ruled that the
plaintiff had only changed her theory of recovery and that the declaratory
judgment suit involved the same cause of action that she had already liti-
gated in federal court.473 With respect to the plaintiff's second argument,
the supreme court concluded that the federal court, having exercised juris-
diction over plaintiff's other pendent claims against the first defendant,
would certainly have exercised its discretion to entertain pendent jurisdic-
tion over the declaratory judgment claim as well.474 The supreme court like-
wise opined that the federal court would have exercised pendent party
jurisdiction over the second defendant, at least with respect to the declara-
tory judgment claim, since the plaintiff had also asserted a securities claim in
the federal litigation that was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
court.475 Accordingly, the supreme court held that res judicata barred the
plaintiff from pursuing her declaratory judgment action against both
defendants.476
Agreements between Counsel. Kennedy v. Hyde477 considered an unusual set
of circumstances in which numerous parties embroiled in a lawsuit concern-
ing the sale of securities became involved in settlement discussions. These
discussions resulted in the drafting and eventual signing of documents set-
tling the suit. When one of the original defendants refused to execute the
settlement papers, the plaintiffs amended their pleadings and introduced the
oral settlement as an additional basis for relief. The trial court ordered a
separate trial on the existence and validity of the alleged oral agreement and,
pursuant to appropriate jury findings, entered a judgment enforcing the set-
tlement agreement against the recalcitrant defendant. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that rule 11478 did not prohibit the enforcement of dis-
puted oral settlement agreements. 479
Pointing to at least two recent occasions when it had strongly implied that
472. Under this test the causes of action are the same if the primary right and duty and the
delict or wrong are the same in each action. Hall v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 512 F.2d 481, 483
(5th Cir. 1975). The court felt constrained to follow this federal rule of res judicata since the
original lawsuit took place in federal court even though it involved both federal and state-
related claims. 688 S.W.2d at 103 (citing Commercial Box & Lumber Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
623 F.2d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 1980)).
473. 688 S.W.2d at 104.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 105, see Boudreaux v. Puckett, 611 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1980) (assertion of
pendent party jurisdiction is most compelling when federal court maintains exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the underlying federal claim).
476. 688 S.W.2d at 104, 106. Although the court also held that plaintiffs interference
claim against the second defendant with respect to the contract was barred for the same rea-
sons, it remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of plaintiffs interference claims
involving other contracts that were not the subject of the federal court action. Id. at 107.
477. 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1984).
478. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11 provides: "No agreement between attorneys or parties touching
any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as
part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record."




settlement agreements were subject to the strictures of rule 11,480 the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the trial court and the court of
appeals. 48 1 Stating that it would not eviscerate the rule, the court held that
rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements con-
cerning pending suits, including agreed judgments. 482 Since the oral agree-
ment was disputed and unenforceable at the moment its existence was denied
in defendant's pleadings, rule 11 prohibited further inquiry. 48 3
The court of appeals in Smith v. Morris & Co. 484 reiterated the well known
rule that parties cannot validly stipulate to the legal conclusions to be drawn
from the facts of the case.48 5 Accordingly, a stipulation that appellant was a
bona fide purchaser for value was without effect and did not bind the parties
or the trial court.4 86
Notice. In Costello v. Johnson48 7 the court held that a party's compliance
with rule 21a 4 88 by attaching a certificate of service upon opposing counsel
constituted a prima facie showing of notice.489 In affirming the trial court's
rendition of a summary judgment, the court of appeals rejected the defend-
ant's contention that he was entitled to a reversal unless the record affirma-
tively demonstrated his receipt of the notice.490 That argument, according
to the court, was contrary to the plain language of rule 21a. 49 1
480. See Williams v. Hollingsworth, 568 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. 1978); Vickrey v. Ameri-
can Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976).
481. 682 S.W.2d at 528.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 530.
484. 694 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
485. Id. at 39.
486. Id.
487. 680 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refrd n.r.e.).
488. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a (providing methods of giving notice).
489. 680 S.W.2d at 531.
490. Id.
491. Id. In reaching this conclusion the court expressly disagreed with the statement in
Booker v. Hill, 570 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ), that the record must
show receipt of notice of the motion. 680 S.W.2d at 532.
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